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ABSTRACT 
  Social media platforms and smartphone manufacturers face class 
action lawsuits, but how open are federal courts to using these very 
technologies to notify members of a class action? This Article details 
the results from an empirical analysis of over 2700 federal class notice 
decisions. It finds class notice changing, but very slowly. Supreme 
Court precedent demands a dynamic standard for class action notice. 
However, fears of change, technology, and imprecision keep courts 
tethered to twentieth-century modes of communication. This judicial 
fear encumbers E-Notice—at a cost to the utility of class action 
procedures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Each morning, you stumble down the steps, open the front door, 
and retrieve three national newspapers. While the coffee is brewing, 
you slip the first paper from its protective plastic and rustle it open. 
Your eyes start searching the freshly inked pages. No luck. Same result 
with the second paper. You pour a cup of coffee then pick up the third 
daily, flipping from page to page. On page D12, success. You tear out 
the phone number listed, saving it for later. Now onto that second cup 
of coffee, a reward for your daily search for class action notices that 
impact you. 
The Supreme Court triggered this disconnect with reality in 1950.1 
In Mullane v. Central Hanover,2 the Court held that the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments mandate providing individuals notice and an 
opportunity to be heard in pending litigation.3 Such procedural due 
process requirements are minimal: neither actual notice nor the best 
form of notice is necessary.4 Rather than curtailing notice methods, the 
 
 1. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see also Alexander 
W. Aiken, Class Action Notice in the Digital Age, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 982 (2017) (“Courts 
have long recognized the problems inherent in this fiction, but as readership shrinks, that legal 
fiction diverges further from reality.”); Brian Walters, “Best Notice Practicable” in the Twenty-
First Century, 2003 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 4, 8 (“In [large consumer class actions], courts regularly 
rely on the legal fiction that publication in newspapers which class members are somewhat more 
likely to read is sufficient to put class members on notice of the pending action and their rights.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 2. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.  
 3. The Mullane Court stated: 
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process 
Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of 
life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for 
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. 
Id. at 313. 
 4. Id. at 317. In fact, the Court approves of newspaper notice, despite the unlikelihood of it 
providing actual notice:  
Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small 
type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the 
area of the newspaper’s normal circulation the odds that the information will never 
reach him are large indeed. 
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Court opted for case-specific flexibility.5 
As any first-year law student can recite, notice need only be 
“reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections.”6 This standard applies to all 
life, liberty, and property interests7—including those implicated by 
class actions.8 Despite this intended flexibility, though, many courts 
merely collapse the procedural due process inquiry into a pro forma 
requirement for mail and newspaper notice.9 
Reliance on conscribed notice methods in class actions has 
become even more fantastical with the passage of time and the growth 
of new technologies.10 The volume of first-class, single-piece mail has 
 
Id. at 315. Nor does procedural due process require actual notice in other common contexts, like 
eminent domain. See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006) (“Due process does not 
require that a property owner receive actual notice before the government may take his 
property.”); Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 162 (2002) (clarifying that procedural due 
process for a prisoner rights case merely requires the State “attempt to provide actual notice, not 
that it must provide actual notice”). 
 5. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317 (“Thus it has been recognized that, in the case of persons missing 
or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification is all that 
the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights.”). 
 6. Id. at 314. 
 7. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (guaranteeing “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 8. Soon after Mullane, Congress codified amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23, which governs class action procedures. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1966); see also DEBORAH R. 
HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 12–
14 (2000) (describing the 1966 amendments); Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act 
of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1488 (2008) (same). 
These amendments clarify when litigants must provide notice in class actions. FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(c)(2), (d)(2), (e).  
 9. See, e.g., Klein v. O’Neal, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 632, 640 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (approving a 
notification plan without analysis of alternative methods of notice); Smith v. Ajax Magnethermic 
Corp., No. 4:02CV0980, 2007 WL 3355080, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2007) (same). 
 10. See, e.g., MICHAEL CREW, PIER LUIGI PARCU & TIMOTHY BRENNAN, THE CHANGING 
POSTAL AND DELIVERY SECTOR: TOWARDS A RENAISSANCE 2 (2017) (detailing the decline of 
correspondence by mail); Randolph E. Schmid, You Never Write Anymore; Well, Hardly Anyone 
Does, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2011), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/4/you-
never-write-anymore-well-hardly-anyone-does [https://perma.cc/69ZY-AXCS] (“[P]ersonal 
letters—as well as the majority of bill payments—largely have been replaced by email, Twitter, 
Facebook and the like.”); see also Elizabeth M.C. Scheibel, #rule23 #classaction #notice: Using 
Social Media, Text Messaging, and Other New Communications Technology for Class Action 
Notice and Returning to Rule 23(c)(2)(B)’s “Best Notice Practicable” Standard, 42 MITCHELL 
HAMLINE L. REV. 1331, 1346 (2016) (“Weekday newspaper circulation has dropped significantly 
in the last decade . . . .”). 
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dropped by half over the last decade.11 Mail is increasingly limited to 
packages from online purchases, the occasional political flyer, and 
weekly sales circulars. So in decline it faces bankruptcy,12 the United 
States Postal Service struggles for its continued existence, facing 
renewed proposals to curtail service13 despite ever-rising postal rates.14 
Meanwhile, new communication technologies flourish. More than 84 
percent of Americans now have home computers.15 An even greater 
number own cell phones.16 From 1997 to 2003, alone, internet use more 
than tripled.17 
Given the purpose of class notice is to “maximize delivery of relief 
to class members,”18 a seismic shift from mail and newspaper notice to 
new methods would seem like a natural evolution. Yet such change has 
not fully materialized. Even worse, the failure of courts to update 
notice requirements in an era of smartphones and Snapchat has gone 
unstudied. While previous articles have addressed specific types of 
 
 11. USPS, A Decade of Facts & Figures, https://facts.usps.com/table-facts [https://perma.cc/ 
VW8T-BSC3] (showing 35.4 billion in single piece first class mail in 2008 and 18.5 billion in 2017). 
 12. Emily Stephenson & Cezary Podkul, Factbox: Why the Postal Service is Going Bankrupt, 
REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-postal-decline-idUSTRE81D
0OO20120214 [https://perma.cc/3D2B-7E86]. Renewed efforts to cut expenses during the Obama 
administration did little to assist the USPS’s long-term viability. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR 
GENERAL, MAIL PROCESSING AND TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONAL CHANGES AUDIT 
REPORT (Sept. 2, 2016) (discussing how changes to mail service productivity did not result in the 
projected realized savings).  
 13. See, e.g., Paul Ziobro, Trump’s Fix for Post Office’s Deep Losses: Cut Back Saturday 
Delivery, WALL ST. J. (May 26, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-fix-for-post-offices-
deep-losses-cut-back-saturday-delivery-1495817168 [https://perma.cc/P3VC-RTCK\]. 
 14. Between 1980 and 2007, the cost for first class mail increased roughly 3.6 percent. See 
Trent Hamm, U.S.P.S. Announces the Forever Stamp: Is It Worth Your $0.39?, SIMPLE DOLLAR 
(Feb. 27, 2007), https://www.thesimpledollar.com/usps-announces-the-forever-stamp-is-it-worth-
your-039 [https://perma.cc/RZV4-JPRV]. From 2007 to 2017, though, the cost increased 19.5 
percent. Compare id. (detailing a Forever stamp price of 39 cents in 2007), with USPS, U.S. Postal 
Service Announces New Prices for 2018 (Oct. 6, 2017), https://about.usps.com/news/national-
releases/2017/pr17062.htm [https://perma.cc/QH4R-5HTR] (announcing a Forever stamp price of 
50 cents in 2018).  
 15. CENSUS BUREAU’S AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY PROVIDES NEW STATE AND 
LOCAL INCOME, POVERTY, HEALTH INSURANCE STATISTICS, U. S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 18, 
2014) [hereinafter COMPUTER CENSUS], https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/
2014/cb14-170.html [https://perma.cc/TQ3E-UUA3].  
 16. Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheet/mobile [https://perma.cc/7LTA-TMUD]. 
 17. From 1997 (the first year in which the CPS collected information on Internet use) to 
2003, use of the Internet among adults jumped from 22 percent to 60 percent. COMPUTER 
CENSUS, supra note 15, at 11.  
 18. Advisory Committee Notes, 39 F.R.D. 98, 105, 107 (1966). 
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notice via technology,19 no article to date has comprehensively 
evaluated judicial response to these methods.20 
This Article presents the first quantitative exploration of E-
Notice, a term encompassing the extensive range of technological 
options for providing notice. E-Notice includes emails, text messages, 
website advertisements, banner ads, keyword ad campaigns, social 
media posts, and other digital–electronic communication. E-Notice 
also captures hypertargeting—the use of Big Data (Facebook likes, 
cookies, and other electronically stored information) to provide 
directed communications to class members. 
The ripples from this lack of understanding of E-Notice are 
significant. Neither the Rule 23 Subcommittee to the Federal Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules nor the Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”) has 
studied E-Notice. Nonetheless, they articulate contrary positions on its 
use.21 The Rule 23 Subcommittee assumes courts approve the use of 
such technology.22 It proposes amending Rule 23 to codify judicial 
consideration of E-Notice.23 Concurrently, though, the FJC advises 
 
 19. See, e.g., Caley DeGroote, Can You Hear Me Now? The Reasonableness of Sending 
Notice Through Text Messages and Its Potential Impact on Impoverished Communities, 23 WASH. 
& LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 279, 280 (2016); Jennifer Mingus, Email: A Constitutional (and 
Economical) Method of Transmitting Class Action Notice, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 87, 88 (1999) 
(discussing email class notice). But see Aiken, supra note 1 (discussing various modes of electronic 
notice, but focusing more on the method of notice than on the judicial justification for it).  
 20. The Federal Trade Commission recently authorized a study on class notice, but such 
research is still in its infancy. Moreover, the study focuses on response rates rather than a range 
of class notice methods. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Seeks To Study Class Action Settlements 
(Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/11/ftc-seeks-study-class-
action-settlements [https://perma.cc/7X3P-9TGD] (discussing the Agency’s plan to “[a]nalyze the 
[e]ffectiveness of [c]lass [a]ction Settlement Notice Programs”). 
 21. The Federal Judiciary Center data on E-Notice is scant and outdated. See, e.g., THOMAS 
E. WILLGING, LAURAL L. HOOPER & ROBERT J. NIEMIC, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL 
STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 7 (1996) (discussing class notice in four circuits over 
twenty years ago).  
 22. The Rule 23 Subcommittee’s working assumption is that “courts and counsel have begun 
to employ new technology to make notice more effective.” REPORT OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
ON CIVIL RULES 97 (Nov. 5–6, 2015) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE 2015 REPORT ON 
RULE 23], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2015-11-civil-agenda_book.pdf. [https:// 
perma.cc/Z5A5-5R74]. 
 23. COMM. ON THE RULES OF PRACTICE & PROC., SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 22–24 (Sept. 
2016); Memorandum from Hon. John D. Bates, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Hon. Jeffrey 
S. Sutton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Proc. (May 12, 2016) (on file with Duke Law 
Journal) [hereinafter Advisory Committee Memo]. The public comment period ended February 
15, 2017. If approved, the changes will go into effect December 1, 2018. 
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against E-Notice methods. In its Judges’ Class Action Notice and 
Claims Process Checklist, the FJC equates mail notice with the ideal 
notice,24 going so far as to caution judges against approving E-Notice.25 
Similarly, scholarship on E-Notice has often traded on 
generalities.26 One line of scholarship characterizes the judiciary as 
woefully behind in embracing E-Notice’s cost-saving and increased 
notice potential.27 Another line summarily concludes courts now prefer 
E-Notice to more traditional forms.28 One practitioner even contends 
she uses E-Notice in close to 50 percent of her cases, suggesting the 
scholarly cry for change is stale.29 
The judiciary, practitioners, and scholars have been working in an 
empirical vacuum. This Article provides much-needed data. It 
synthesizes the analysis of over 2700 federal class actions—thirteen 
years of notice decisions. It reveals slow change. Technological options 
for approved class notice are expanding.30 Yet the judiciary remains 
 
 24. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDGES’ CLASS ACTION NOTICE AND CLAIMS PROCESS 
CHECKLIST AND PLAIN LANGUAGE GUIDE 2 (2010) [hereinafter CHECKLIST] (“If names and 
addresses are reasonably identifiable, Rule 23(c)(2) requires individual notice. Be careful to look 
closely at assertions that mailings are not feasible.”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. For example, one article hypothesizes only 15 to 20 percent of class notices utilize E-
Notice, but the article bases that figure on limited anecdotal research. See, e.g., Erin Coe, Social  
Media Class Notices Gain Traction But Carry Risks, LAW 360 (Apr. 24, 2015), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/647414/social-media-class-notices-gain-traction-but-carry-risks 
[https://perma.cc/QMN8-UXB4] (quoting a law firm partner saying she used social media for class 
notice in over half of the settlements in the past five years). 
 27. See, e.g., Aiken, supra note 1, at 970 (arguing “courts and parties can do more” to use 
technology in class notice); Philip P. Ehrlich, A Balancing Equation for Social Media Publication 
Notice, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 2163, 2166 (2016); Deborah R. Hensler, Bringing Shutts into the Future: 
Rethinking Protection of Future Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 585, 611 
(2006) (arguing that “notice of a pending settlement should be given in print and broadcast media 
and on the Internet” for mass tort actions). See generally Robert H. Klonoff, Mark Herrmann & 
Bradley W. Harrison, Making Class Actions Work: The Untapped Potential of the Internet, 69 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 727 (2008) (discussing the ability of the internet to foster participation by absent 
class members and noting ways that notice may be provided over the internet). 
 28. See, e.g., Klonoff, Herrmann & Harrison, supra note 27, at 733–34 (“Indeed, courts are 
beginning to embrace the belief that internet notice may be preferable to traditional methods of 
publication notice.”). 
 29. See, e.g., Coe, supra note 26 (quoting a partner at BakerHostetler who attests that, in 
about half of those cases, social media is added as a component of the notification program).  
 30. Accord LESLIE P. FRANCIS & JOHN G. FRANCIS, PRIVACY: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS 
TO KNOW 37 (2017) (“‘Big Data’ is a loose term used to refer to the vast data sets being collected 
by many different kinds of entities all over the world today. ‘Big Data’ may be collected by 
governments . . . , data analytics firms, search engines, websites, and many, many other types of 
entities.”); VICTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA 6–7 (2013) 
(describing the growth of Big Data). 
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deeply divided. While some courts embrace these technological 
advances,31 the dominant approach is anachronistic. Many courts still 
treat mail and publication as the gold standards of notice—newspaper 
notice, let alone E-Notice, is considered too radical.32 Even the use of 
email notice is presumed too risky.33 In fact, some courts treat mailed 
notice as so essential that they deny class certification when mail is 
impracticable.34 When technology is used, it is generally limited to 
settlement websites.35 However, such websites are primarily passive 
resources that class members can search out after learning about 
pending litigation. Rather than notice per se, they provide 
supplemental appendices of material about the case and claims 
process. 
This Article’s empirical data provides the required foundation for 
a greater understanding of judicial attitudes towards E-Notice. It goes 
beyond facts and figures to explore the breadth of, barriers to, and 
reliance on alternative forms of class notice. Rather than advancing the 
flexibility intended by the Supreme Court, fear of change, 
imperfection, and technology leave some courts clinging to mail and 
publication notice as the primary means of satisfying procedural due 
 
 31. See, e.g., In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litig., 309 F.R.D. 573, 586 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (using 
email and settlement website notice); Chimeno–Buzzi v. Hollister Co., No. 14-23120-CIV, 2015 
WL 9269266, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2015) (approving a plan that would include “an E-mail 
Notice, a Double Post Card Notice, a Publication Notice, and Banner Advertisements”); In re HP 
Inkjet Printer Litig., No. C05-3580 JF, 2010 WL 11488941, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010) 
(approving notice through email, publication, and a settlement website). 
 32. See infra Part II (detailing findings of this empirical study). 
 33. See, e.g., Lewis v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, No. C2-11-CV-0058, 2011 WL 8960489, at *2 
(S.D. Ohio June 20, 2011) (refusing to approve email notice for fear of forwarding); Reab v. Elec. 
Arts, Inc., 214 F.R.D. 623, 630–31 (D. Colo. 2002). 
 34. See, e.g., Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592–93 (3d Cir. 2012) (denying 
certification, in part, because of obstacles to individualized notice); Randolph v. J.M. Smucker 
Co., 303 F.R.D. 679, 689 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (same); Hoge v. Parkway Chevrolet, Inc., No. CIV.A. 
H-05-2686, 2007 WL 3125298, at *19 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2007) (same); see also Daniel 
Luks, Ascertainability in the Third Circuit: Name That Class Member, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 
2361 (2014) (detailing the growing ascertainability split and its impact on certification).  
 35. See, e.g., Dewey v. Volkswagen of Am., 909 F. Supp. 2d 373, 379 (D.N.J. 2012), aff’d sub 
nom. Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 558 F. App’x 191 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Specifically, 
pursuant to the Amended Preliminary Approval Order, notice to those class members of 
the settlement has been provided by: (1) mail and publication; (2) the establishment of a toll-free 
telephone number providing settlement information; and (3) the maintenance of 
a website containing notice and settlement documents.”); Montoya v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. 1:14-
CV-20474, 2015 WL 11216718, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2015) (approving mailed and settlement 
website notice plan); Wilson v. EverBank, N.A., No. 14-CIV-22264, 2015 WL 10857344, at *3 
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2015) (same). 
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process.36 Until these fears are recognized and addressed, E-Notice 
growth will stagnate, sacrificing the effectiveness of class actions and 
the enforcement of a constitutional right.37 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the statutory 
requirements and relevant jurisprudence for class notice. As this 
background is already well known, it is intentionally abbreviated to 
provide a foundation for the material that follows. Part II, the empirical 
core of this piece, sorts through myth and conjecture to expose current 
trends in class action notice. It details notice methods over time, by 
circuit, by procedural context, and by substantive claim at issue. It then 
builds on these findings to demonstrate and debunk the fear-based 
barriers to E-Notice. Part III then returns to the fundamental 
principles from Mullane to offer solutions for overcoming judicial 
fears. It outlines pragmatic, workable alterations to the class notice 
process to ensure outdated approaches do not compromise class 
actions. 
I.  CLASS NOTICE: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 
Class action notice has two sources: constitutional procedural due 
process requirements and the statutes codifying them.38 While scholars 
have painstakingly detailed the development of procedural due 
process,39 this Part focuses squarely on due process in class actions. It 
connects notice jurisprudence to class action requirements under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and, in doing so, provides the 
requisite background to evaluate class notice. 
A. Pragmatism and Procedural Due Process 
As far back as the late 1800s, the judiciary has emphasized 
pragmatic flexibility in defining due process requirements.40 When 
pending litigation impacts individuals’ rights, the Constitution requires 
 
 36. See infra Part II (discussing these obstacles to E-Notice). 
 37. See infra Part III (discussing the importance of creative notice plans).  
 38. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.; id. amend. XIV, § 1; FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 39. See, e.g., JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY (2003); E. THOMAS 
SULLIVAN & TONI M. MASSARO, THE ARC OF DUE PROCESS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (2013) [hereinafter ARC]; RHONDA WASSERMAN, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A 
REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2004). 
 40. ARC, supra note 39, at 22 (discussing the history of procedural due process); Matthew J. 
Steilen, Due Process As Choice of Law: A Study in the History of A Judicial Doctrine, 24 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1047, 1051 (2016) (same). 
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notice and an opportunity to be heard.41 Rather than a checklist fixed 
in time, “standards of due process should be determined and adjusted 
according to the customs of the age.”42 Notice need only be reasonably 
calculated to reach the intended audience; actual notice is not 
necessary.43 
Perhaps an apt description of notice requirements is simply “do 
your best under the circumstances.”44 Mullane v. Central Hanover,45 the 
seminal case for notice,46 illustrates the Court’s pragmatic approach. 
The case involved a New York banking law that permitted the 
defendant bank to aggregate assets from multiple trusts into a single, 
common trust.47 The defendant had the mailing address for a portion 
of the affected beneficiaries.48 However, banking law only required the 
defendant to provide notice by publication in a local newspaper.49 
 
 41. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (guaranteeing “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); see also Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (holding, in a class action, that a “chose in 
action” qualifies as a constitutionally recognized property interest for purposes of procedural due 
process); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 n.4 (1982) (concluding that, although 
not a traditional property right and thus not subject to takings analysis, a state tort-law claim is a 
species of property protected by procedural due process); A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 
994, 1014 (4th Cir. 1989) (accepting, for purposes of procedural due process and change of venue 
analysis, that a tort claim is a “‘species of property’ in the constitutional sense”); Ryland v. 
Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 972–73 (5th Cir. 1983) (recognizing a wrongful death action as property for 
procedural due process purposes because state law defined such action as a property right). While 
this characterization is long settled in the courts, some scholars continue to argue class claims are 
more properly characterized as collective rights than as individual rights. See, e.g., J. Maria 
Glover, A Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims, 70 VAND. L. REV. 221, 228 (2017) (setting “forth 
the long-standing conceptual debate about the nature of class members and class actions”).  
 42. ARC, supra note 39, at 22 (discussing Justice Matthews’ opinion in Hurtado v. California, 
110 U.S. 516 (1884)).  
 43. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 812 (1985); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 
417 U.S. 156, 174–75 (1974); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 
(1950); Hecht v. United Collection Bureau, Inc., 691 F.3d 218, 224 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal citation 
omitted); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.3d 315, 327 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 44. Or, to adopt Ninth Circuit Judge Hufstedler’s more colorful refrain, “[p]rocedural due 
process is flexible, but it is not flaccid.” Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortg. Invs., 
504 F.2d 483, 498 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 45. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
 46. WASSERMAN, supra note 39, at 131 (2004) (“Fifty years after it was decided, Mullane 
continues to be the leading case on the constitutionally required form and extent of notice.”). 
 47. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 307. 
 48. Id. at 310. 
 49. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 100-c(12) (2014).  
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Mullane, a court appointed special guardian for the trusts, challenged 
the method and content of the notice.50 
The Court began by rejecting personal service for unnamed 
parties affected by pending litigation.51 Instead, notice satisfies 
procedural due process, so long as the “form chosen is not substantially 
less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and 
customary substitutes.”52 Emphasizing flexibility, the Supreme Court 
did not mandate a particular method of notice.53 Instead, the Court 
adopted a two-tier standard for evaluating the best notice practicable.54 
First, individualized notice is required when realistic.55 Thus, in the case 
at hand, the bank had to mail notice directly to any beneficiary for 
which it had an address or could obtain one through reasonable 
means.56 Second, for all others, alternative or “constructive” notice 
sufficed.57 
 
 50. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 310. 
 51. Id. at 313 (“Personal service of written notice within the jurisdiction is the classic form of 
notice always adequate in any type of proceeding.”). 
 52. Id.  
 53. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for 
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”). As the Court explained in 
Morrissey, this proposition “has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require 
citation of authority.” Id. The Court has quoted this language in numerous decisions since 
Morrissey. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005); Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 
930 (1997); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 15 n.15 (1978); Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); see also Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) (“[D]ue 
process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to 
time, place and circumstances.” (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (“The very 
nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every 
imaginable situation.” (citations omitted)); 16B AM. JUR. 2D CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 957 
(“[T]he quantum and quality of the process due in a particular situation depends on the need to 
serve the due process function of minimizing the risk of error in decision making.”); Jason Parkin, 
Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1311 (2012) (discussing the flexible nature of 
procedural due process).  
 54. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985) (“The notice must be 
the best practicable, ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” 
(quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, and citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 174–75 
(1974))). Lower courts consistently parrot this language. See, e.g., Adams v. S. Farm Bureau Life 
Ins. Co., 493 F.3d 1276, 1287 n.5 (11th Cir. 2007); In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 
F.2d 1088, 1104 (5th Cir. 1977); Perez v. Asurion Corp., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1377 (S.D. Fla. 
2007).  
 55. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 317; see also STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET Y. K. WOO, LITIGATING IN 
AMERICA: CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT 83 (2006) (summarizing Mullane by saying 
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The Mullane Court fully recognized the potential deficiencies with 
constructive notice. Nonetheless, the Court held “even a probably 
futile means of notification is all that the situation permits and creates 
no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing [affected individuals’] 
rights.”58 Moreover, the Court elected to not “commit[] itself to any 
formula achieving a balance between these interests in a particular 
proceeding or determining when constructive notice may be utilized or 
what test it must meet.”59 Instead, the Court analyzed the form of 
constructive notice by considering the specifics of the case, including 
the cost involved with such notice, whether the individuals were 
unknown or missing, and the reach of the proposed form.60 In justifying 
this low bar for constitutional compliance, the Court explained a 
“construction of the Due Process Clause which would place impossible 
or impractical obstacles in the way could not be justified.”61 
Subsequent decisions have modified procedural due process 
requirements outside of class actions,62 while sticking closely to the 
original themes of flexibility, practicality, and case-specific 
determination.63 For class notice, though, Mullane alone still controls.64 
 
“[r]easonableness is the key.”).  
 58. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317 (citing Cunnius v. Reading Sch. Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1905), Blinn 
v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911), and Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.S. 261 (1912)). 
 59. Id. at 314. 
 60. Id. at 316–18. 
 61. Id. at 313–14. 
 62. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (discussing procedural due 
process standards for the termination of social security disability benefits); Jason Parkin, Due 
Process Disaggregation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 289–98 (2014) (detailing Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on procedural due process).  
 63. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (“It is by now well established that ‘due 
process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to 
time, place and circumstances.’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. 
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961))); see also Eric Wills Orts, Tenants’ Rights in Police 
Power Condemnations Under State Statutes and Procedural Due Process, 23 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 105, 142 (1989) (discussing the flexibility of procedural due process jurisprudence); 
Steilen, supra note 40, at 1051 (discussing the historical development of procedural due process 
requirements “toward a flexible and open-ended test centered around due process values”). 
 64. Twenty years later, the Supreme Court directly applied the Mullane standard to class 
actions in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). During the case’s fourth visit to the 
high court, the Supreme Court discussed notice. See Michael A. Berch, We’ve Only Just Begun: 
The Impact of Remand Orders from Higher to Lower Courts on American Jurisprudence, 36 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 493, 511 n.103 (2004) (detailing the various Eisen decisions). The decision is best known 
for pronouncing which party pays for notice and for reinforcing a preference for individualized 
notice when possible. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177; see also Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 
340, 350 (1978) (“The specific holding of Eisen IV is that where a representative plaintiff prepares 
and mails the class notice himself, he must bear the cost of doing so.”). However, the decision also 
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In later class action decisions, the Court affirmed Mullane and 
reiterated the “best notice practicable” standard.65 As discussed next, 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mirror this reasonable approach 
to notice. 
B. Due Process & Class Action Notice Requirements 
In addition to this controlling precedent, statutory requirements 
also govern class action notice. Congress codified notice requirements66 
in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(d),67 23(e),68 and 23(c)(2).69 
Each triggers notice at a different procedural juncture, yet the rules 
share certain commonalities. First, in evaluating any notice plan, courts 
are obligated to protect the interests of absent class members.70 Second, 
 
reinforces flexibility in evaluating notice modes rather than mandating particular modes of 
individual or constructive notice. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 184 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (“The 
purpose of Rule 23 is to provide flexibility in the management of class actions, with the trial court 
taking an active role in the conduct of the litigation.” (citations omitted)). 
 65. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985); Eisen, 417 U.S. at 
174–76. 
 66. See, e.g., Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1317 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The notice 
provisions of Rule 23, which are meant to protect the due process rights of absent class members, 
set forth ‘different notice requirements to different kinds of cases and even to different phases of 
the same case.’” (quoting Battle v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 770 F. Supp. 1499, 1515 (N.D. Ala. 
1991))).  
 67. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d).  
 68. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
 69. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). For certain types of claims, additional statutory notice is 
required. For example, securities cases must also comply with notice requirements under the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (a)(3)(A)(i) (requiring plaintiff to 
issue notice “in a widely circulated national business-oriented publication or wire service” within 
twenty days of filing a complaint). Also, in FLSA cases, courts issue notice upon conditional 
certification—a prerequisite to class certification under Rule 23. See, e.g., Laroque v. Domino’s 
Pizza, LLC, 557 F. Supp. 2d 346, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); White v. MPW Indus. Serv., Inc., 236 
F.R.D. 363, 366 (E.D. Tenn. 2006); De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 660, 662–63 
(E.D. Pa. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 342 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2003); Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. 
Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 171 (1989). Conditional certification is a low bar, requiring solely that 
plaintiffs establish other putative class members exist who are “similarly situated in their job 
requirements and pay provisions.” Lee v. Metrocare Servs., 980 F. Supp. 2d 754, 759 (N.D. Tex. 
2013 (quoting Marshall v. Eyemasters of Tex., Ltd., 272 F.R.D. 447, 449 (N.D. Tex. 2011))); see, 
e.g., id. (“The court’s determination at this stage is made using a ‘fairly lenient standard’ because 
the court generally has minimal evidence.” (quoting Jones v. SuperMedia Inc., 281 F.R.D. 282, 
287 (N.D. Tex. 2012))); see also id. (noting the standard is “admittedly lenient” (quoting Marshall, 
272 F.R.D. at 449)). Conditional certification notice is beyond the scope of this project. 
 70. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981) (“Because of the potential for abuse [of 
the class action process], a district court has both the duty and the broad authority to exercise 
control over a class action and to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel . . . .”) 
(emphasis added); see also Craig M. Freeman, John Randall Whaley & Richard J. Arsenault, 
Knowledge Is Power: A Practical Proposal to Protect Putative Class Members from Improper Pre-
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all three rules apply trans-substantively, regardless of the underlying 
claims. Third, judicial decisions approving these notices are reviewed 
de novo.71 
Further, the tiered approach to procedural due process from 
Mullane applies for all types of class action notice.72 Individual notice 
is preferred when practicable.73 Otherwise, notice through less-
personalized methods suffices.74 Rule 23, though, neither defines 
particular modes of individual or constructive notice nor explains how 
to weigh potential options. This is somewhat unsurprising, given Rule 
23 encourages judicial flexibility to ensure “a good deal of play in the 
joints.”75 Despite this flexibility, courts demonstrate a preference for 
mailed notice. 
Under all three rules, the goal of class notice is the protection of 
plaintiffs. As the draft Advisory Committee notes state, “A claims 
process that maximizes delivery of relief to class members should be a 
primary objective of the notice program.”76 Such notice allows class 
members to decide whether to file a claim or exclude themselves from 
the litigation.77 It also lets them evaluate the fairness and adequacy of 
 
Certification Communication, 2006 FED. CTS. L. REV. 2, Abstract (2006) (“The United States 
Supreme Court and other courts have stated that courts overseeing class actions have a duty to 
protect the interests of absent class members.”). 
 71. DeJulius v. New England Health Care Emps. Pension Fund, 429 F.3d 935, 942 (10th Cir. 
2005) (“The underlying question of whether a particular class action notice program satisfies the 
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and the Due Process Clause is a legal determination we review 
de novo.”); Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying de novo 
review to class action notice plan).  
 72. See, e.g., Advisory Committee Notes, 39 F.R.D. 98, 107 (1966) (“Notice to members of 
the class, whenever employed under amended Rule 23, should be accommodated to the particular 
purpose but need not comply with the formalities for service of process.”). 
 73. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (“For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the 
court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, 
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”). 
 74. Other forms of notice can still comply with procedural due process when “circumstances 
make it impracticable to gain the names and addresses of class members and notify them 
individually of the action’s pendency.” In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 F.2d 1088, 
1097 (5th Cir. 1977); cf. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (“It 
would be idle to pretend that publication alone . . . is a reliable means of acquainting interested 
parties of the fact that their rights are before the courts. It is not an accident that the greater 
number of cases reaching this Court on the question of adequacy of notice have been concerned 
with actions founded on process constructively served through local newspapers.”). 
 75. Completion of Work Committee Meeting of Oct. 31–Nov. 2, 1963, at 4, Memorandum to 
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Dec. 2, 1963).  
 76. Advisory Committee 2015 Report on Rule 23, supra note 22. 
 77. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, ADDITIONAL MATERIALS IN PREPARATION FOR 
MEETING OF FEB. 21–23, 1963 (Jan. 17, 1963) (“This notice could invite attention to any 
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the representation.78 While other aspects of the 1964 Amendment 
generated great debate, the addition of flexible notice requirements 
was uncontroversial.79  
Despite the similarities, each rule has a different procedural 
trigger. Rule 23(d) affords courts discretionary power to issue notice at 
any time, so long as the court deems it necessary “for the protection of 
the members of the class.”80 In contrast, Rule 23(e) is a mandatory 
notice provision.81 It requires notice “in a reasonable manner” to class 
members for settlements, judgments, or dismissals of class actions.82 
Rule 23(c)(2) applies to notice of class certification decisions. Rule 
23 provides for three categories of class actions:83 (b)(1) classes require 
a genuine risk that separate individual actions would lead to 
“incompatible standards” or prejudice;84 (b)(2) classes generally 
request declaratory or injunctive relief; and (b)(3) classes, the most 
common category, seek monetary relief.85 
Rule 23(c)(2) notice is mandatory for (b)(3) classes but only 
discretionary for (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes.86 Unlike (b)(1) and (b)(2), a 
 
opportunity of the members to come into the action, and state the court’s intention to extend the 
judgment ultimately entered, whether or not favorable to the class, to all members.”).  
 78. See Discussion of Responses to Memorandum of Dec. 2, 1963, at 7 (Jan. 31, 1964) 
(discussing how notice allows “members to signify whether they consider the representation to be 
fair and adequate [thus providing] a further check against possible rigging.”). 
 79. Of the Committee members, John P. Frank, attorney in Phoenix, Arizona, and member 
of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules between 1963 and 1970, was the most outspoken critic 
of the proposed revisions to the categories of class actions at the core of the 1964 Amendment. 
While he raised significant concerns about mass tort class actions and opt-out provisions for (b)(3) 
actions, even he did not raise concerns about the proposed notice requirements. See generally id. 
 80. Advisory Committee Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 97 (1966). 
 81. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1) (“The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all 
class members who would be bound by the proposal.”) (emphasis added). 
 82. Id. 
 83. All three classes must satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a): numerosity, typicality, 
commonality, and adequacy. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). For (b)(3) classes, though, plaintiffs must also 
establish two additional requirements: predominance and superiority. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) 
(“[T]he court [must] find[] that the questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”). 
 84. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 85. See, e.g., D. Theodore Rave, When Peace Is Not the Goal of A Class Action Settlement, 
50 GA. L. REV. 475, 483 n.18 (2016) (“[T]he most common form of class actions [are] those 
seeking monetary damages . . . .”); Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional 
Implications of Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1730 (2006) (“Most suits 
fall under Rule 23(b)(3), where plaintiffs primarily seek monetary damages . . . .”). 
 86. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (“[T]he court must direct to class members the best notice 
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be 
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(b)(3) class binds members unless they affirmatively opt out.87 Facially, 
Rule 23(c)(2) notice differs slightly from Rule 23(e) notice. For cases 
seeking monetary damages, Rule 23(c)(2) requires the best notice 
practicable—echoing the Mullane standard88—whereas Rule 23(e) 
only requires notice be given to class members “in a reasonable 
manner.”89 As the Tenth Circuit has explained, “The lower standard is 
justified because the court has already certified that the class 
representation would be fair and adequate, and the unnamed class 
members have already made the decision to allow the named plaintiffs 
to represent them.”90 
Parties usually file joint submissions setting forth a plan for any 
type of Rule 23 notice.91 This is not to say, however, that such plans are 
beyond scrutiny. When the parties reach an agreement prior to class 
certification, they request such certification as part of the settlement 
 
identified through reasonable effort.”). For (b)(1) and (b)(2) cases, Rule 23(c)(2)(A) governs 
notice. It permits the court to “direct appropriate notice to the class,” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A), 
but such notice is discretionary, and courts should exercise this discretionary authority “with 
care.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment.  
 87. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). This notice must “clearly and concisely” detail the following: 
(i) the nature of the action; 
(ii) the definition of the class certified; 
(iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; 
(iv) that a class member may enter an appearance through an attorney if the member 
so desires; 
(v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion; 
(vi) the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and 
(vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3). 
Id. 
 88. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (“For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must 
direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including 
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”). For (b)(1) 
and (b)(2) classes, the standard is lower. Id. at (c)(2)(A) (“For any class certified under Rule 
23(b)(1) or (b)(2) or (b)(2), the court may direct appropriate notice to the class.”). 
 89. Id. at (e)(1). Similarly, the content requirement for notice of a settlement class differs 
slightly from notice at (c)(2) notice. See MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:17 (2017). 
 90. Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1012 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Zimmer Paper Prods., Inc. 
v. Berger & Montague, P.C., 758 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that “[a] higher notice standard 
is established by Rule 23(c)(2)” than Rules 23(d)(2) and (e)). 
 91. See, e.g., Bobbitt v. Acad. of Court Reporting, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 327, 345 (E.D. Mich. 2008) 
(directing parties to submit joint notice plans after class certification). Consequently, defendants 
who may have once challenged the ability of plaintiffs to provide notice under Rule 23(c)(2) now 
either acquiesce to class counsel’s notice plan or help generate one. Compare, e.g., Allen v. 
Similasan Corp., 306 F.R.D. 635, 643 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (discussing the defendant’s ascertainability 
challenge to notifying class members), with Allen v. Similasan Corp., No. 12-CV-376-BAS-JLB, 
2016 WL 3951277, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 11, 2016) (detailing the parties’ joint proposal for notifying 
class members of a pending settlement).  
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approval process.92 When this happens, (c)(2) and (e) notice 
requirements often collapse into a single notice under (c)(2).93 The 
parties submit this notice plan for preliminary approval.94 If class 
members take issue with the settlement, certification, or the notice 
plan, they may file objections.95 The court then considers these 
concerns by “objectors” prior to issuing any final approval of the 
settlement.96 
 
 92. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1797.2 
(3d ed. 2017) (“[A] common practice that has evolved in these situations is for the parties to move 
simultaneously for class certification and settlement approval, with a single notice . . . .”); 
WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:34 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing 
judicial approve of combined settlement and certification notice). 
 93. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 223 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(discussing the use of a single notice for certification of a settlement class); McLaurin v. Prestage 
Foods, Inc., No. 7:09-CV-100-BR, 2011 WL 13146422, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 2011) (applying 
(c)(2) content requirements to notice of a settlement class). 
 94. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring judicial approval of a proposed settlement notice). 
 95. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5) (allowing class member objections). 
 96. In theory, such objections have the potential to enhance the quality of the settlement or 
the judicial decision-making about settlement approval. See, e.g., STEVEN S. GENSLER, 1 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULES & COMMENTARY SCOPE INFORMATION R. 23, 
Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2018) (discussing how “[o]bjectors can help point out ways in 
which the settlement is inadequate overall or is unfair to groups or individuals within the class”); 
Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 787 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[O]bjectors play an essential role in 
judicial approval of proposed settlements of class actions” by “flagg[ing] fatal weaknesses in the 
proposed settlement”). In reality, though, many objectors do little more than raise questions that 
do little to benefit the quality of the settlement in hopes of a quick payday. Rule 23 allows fees 
for successful objectors, thus incentivizing a niche market of repeat objectors. See, e.g., Eubank v. 
Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 720 (7th Cir. 2014) (“If their objections persuade the judge to 
disapprove it, and as a consequence a settlement more favorable to the class is negotiated and 
approved, the objectors will receive a cash award that can be substantial . . . .”); In re Trans Union 
Corp. Privacy Litig., 629 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[C]lass lawyers may try to fend off 
interlopers [objectors] who oppose a proposed settlement as insufficiently generous to the 
class; . . . given the role of . . . interlopers in preventing cozy deals that favor class lawyers and 
defendants at the expense of class members, their requests for fees must not be slighted.” (citing 
Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 782–83 (7th Cir. 2006), Vollmer v. Seldon, 350 F.3d 
656, 659–70 (7th Cir. 2000), Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs. Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 880–82 (7th 
Cir. 2000), and In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liability Litig., 55 
F.3d 768, 803 (3d Cir. 1995))). Consequently, courts are unsurprisingly skeptical of professional 
objectors. See, e.g., In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 305 (N.D. Ga. 
1993) (“While some . . . objectors are sincere in their concerns and have been helpful 
in . . . arriv[ing] at a fair and workable settlement, many of their suggestions constitute little more 
than a ‘wish list’ which would be impossible to grant and is hardly in the best interests of the 
class.”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th) § 21.643 (“Some objections, however, are 
made for improper purposes, and benefit only the objectors and their attorneys (e.g., by seeking 
additional compensation to withdraw even ill-founded objections). An objection, even of little 
merit, can be costly and significantly delay implementation of a class settlement.”); cf. Edward 
Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 403, 409 (2003) (“Objectors and their attorneys may be engaged in a form of extortion, 
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Despite the flexibility woven into Rule 23’s notice requirements, 
over the last decade, two lines of judicial interpretation have clouded 
the analysis. First, some courts inject a tailoring requirement into class 
notice. Rather than assessing whether a method of notice is reasonably 
calculated to reach class members, these courts require plans that are 
reasonably calculated to reach only class members.97 
Second, some courts impose an “ascertainability” requirement 
onto Rule 23.98 Ascertainability’s meaning varies, with judges adopting 
contrary positions as to what this assessment demands.99 Some use 
ascertainability to evaluate issues of class manageability;100 others add 
ascertainability to Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement.101 One 
particular interpretation requires Plaintiffs to identify class members 
“using objective criteria.”102 This construction of ascertainability most 
 
seeking to hold up court approval of a settlement in exchange for a piece of a limited settlement 
pot.”). 
 97. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 169 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(rejecting the argument that individual mail notice should have been provided to all 2.4 million 
Vietnam veterans, when “far fewer than that number were exposed to Agent Orange” and thus 
notice would have been “considerably overbroad”); In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 
F.2d 1088, 1099 (5th Cir. 1977) (rejecting the proposed list of individuals to receive class notice, 
including both class members and non-class members, as being over-inclusive and as helpful as a 
“telephone book”); Yeoman v. Ikea U.S. W., Inc., No. 11CV701 WQH (BGS), 2013 WL 5944245, 
at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013) (“Notice to individuals is improper and not required by Rule 23 
when it is overly broad or over-inclusive.”) (citations omitted).  
 98. Some courts impose an “ascertainability” requirement onto manageability, though the 
term itself does not appear in Rule 23(b)(3)(D). Ascertainability concerns first appeared in the 
1980s. E.g., Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 670 (7th Cir. 1981); see also Luks, supra note 34, at 2388–
93 (discussing the policy considerations behind this split). Still others infuse ascertainability into 
numerosity. See, e.g., Christine P. Bartholomew, The Failed Superiority Experiment, 69 VAND. L. 
REV. 1295, 1307 (2016) (discussing how “[a]scertainability’s meaning radically varies”). 
 99. Ascertainability has assumed three meanings: (1) identifying class members “using 
objective criteria; (2) capturing all members necessary to resolve the action in a single proceeding; 
and (3) describing the main claims and defenses that apply to the class.” Stephanie Haas, Class Is 
in Session: The Third Circuit Heightens Ascertainability with Rigor in Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 59 
VILL. L. REV. 793, 804 (2014).  
 100. See, e.g., In re Worldcom, Inc., 343 B.R. 412, 424 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); Boca Raton 
Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 238 F.R.D. 679, 686 (S.D. Fla. 2006), aff’d sub 
nom. Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 582 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2009); 
see also Bartholomew, supra note 98, at 1307 (detailing different ascertainability definitions); Erin 
L. Geller, The Fail-Safe Class as an Independent Bar to Class Certification, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2769, 2778 (2013) (discussing this implicit requirement). 
 101. Ackerman v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 09 CV 395(DLI)(RML), 2013 WL 7044866, at *21 
(E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2013) (balancing judicial access gains against ascertainability challenges to find 
a lack of superiority); see also Bartholomew, supra note 98, at 1331 n.229 (detailing different 
ascertainability definitions). 
 102. See, e.g., Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015); Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 
727 F.3d 300, 305 (3d Cir. 2013); cf. Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 
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directly intersects with notice requirements.103 Some courts apply this 
interpretation to deny certification when individually mailed notice is 
not possible through reasonable efforts.104 As more courts adopt these 
implied requirements and stray from Mullane, they transform 
procedural due process’ flexibility into a rigid preference for mailed 
notice. The impact of this preference is explored next. 
II.  UNDERSTANDING CLASS NOTICE JURISPRUDENCE: SURVEY & 
RESULTS 
To scrutinize judicial interpretation, this Article approaches class 
notice empirically. The underlying analysis is based on over 2700 
federal court decisions from 2005 through 2017.105 It tracks multiple 
variables, including temporal trends, potential circuit differences, and 
variances depending on the substantive law at issue. It also considers 
whether the notice was pursuant to Rule 23(d), Rule 23(c)(2), or Rule 
23(e).106 Finally, where available, it studies potential differences 
 
2015) (describing courts with heightened ascertainability requirements as having “moved beyond 
examining the adequacy of the class definition itself to examine the potential difficulty of 
identifying particular members of the class and evaluating the validity of claims they might 
eventually submit”) (citation omitted); Ransome E. Hare, Class Action Law—the Growing Split 
on the Heightened Test for Ascertainability in Class Certification—Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, 
Inc., 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017), 40 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 615, 615 (2017) (“[A]n ascertainable 
class is typically described as one where class members can be promptly identified simply by 
referencing the objective criteria in the class definition.”). 
 103. A third interpretation also intersects with notice requirements by considering the content 
of the notice—a concept related to procedural due process, as reaching class members is not 
sufficient. See, e.g., In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2437, 2017 WL 3700999, 
at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2017) (blurring ascertainability and notice requirements). 
However, this Article focuses on the mode rather than the content of such notice.  
 104. See, e.g., Clavell v. Midland Funding LLC, No. 10-3593, 2011 WL 2462046, at *4 (E.D. 
Pa. June 21, 2011) (holding ascertainability fails automatically when nothing in defendant 
company’s databases can identify appropriate class members); see also Erin L. Geller, The Fail-
Safe Class As an Independent Bar to Class Certification, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2778 (2013) 
(discussing this implicit requirement); Haas, supra note 99, at 813 (“Absent physical proof of 
purchase, such as receipts or packaging, it is unclear whether consumers will ever be able to satisfy 
the ascertainability requirement.”). 
 105. 2005 marked the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which expanded 
original and removal subject matter jurisdiction for federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2012). 
CAFA requires only minimal diversity for class actions seeking damages over $5 million, 
exclusive of interests and costs. § 1332(d)(6). CAFA results in far more class actions being brought 
in federal court. Thus, while CAFA reserves some class actions for state courts, its enactment 
creates a logical starting point for this empirical analysis.  
 106. All cases are identified from Westlaw’s federal decision database, using the search terms: 
(class /s notice) /p (mail OR publication OR text OR email OR blog OR Google OR Facebook). 
The data was then culled through the following steps: (1) Each case was reviewed for relevancy. 
Cases discussing notice outside of Rule 23 were excluded, such as in bankruptcy orders, 
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between the method of notice the parties requested and the method 
the court eventually ordered. 
The findings challenge the accuracy of some long-standing claims. 
First, courts overwhelmingly cite Mullane in class notice opinions.107 
This contradicts scholarly assertions that the interpretation of Rule 23 
is governed not by Mullane, but by Mathews v. Eldridge,108 a 
subsequent procedural due process case.109 Second, common 
assumptions about the timing of notice are incorrect. For example, one 
scholar states, “Ordinarily, class notification occurs at an early stage 
when the outcome of litigation is uncertain.”110 Yet, most class notice 
occurs at the end of litigation, upon settlement.111 Third, the methods 
of notice in the different types of classes do not noticeably vary, despite 
 
foreclosure decisions, and conditional certification decisions under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
(2) The data was further refined to exclude class certification or settlement approval denials, as 
no class notice is ordered in such cases. (3) Orders approving notice without detailing the notice 
method were excluded. (4) All duplicates were eliminated. This included matching preliminary 
and final settlement approval orders to avoid double-counting. Combined, these four steps 
reduced the relevant data to 1587 decisions.  
 107. See, e.g., Hecht v. United Collection Bureau, Inc., 691 F.3d 218, 224 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Corpac v. Rubin & Rothman, LLC, 920 F. Supp. 2d 345, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Bruno v. Quten 
Research Inst., LLC, No. SACV 11-00173 DOC (EX), 2012 WL 12886843, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 
16, 2012). 
 108. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 109. After Mullane, the Supreme Court next addressed procedural due process in Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). There, the Court articulated a three-part balancing test for 
procedural due process queries. Id. at 335. The Court has not applied this balancing test to class 
notice in subsequent decisions. Rather, the Court distinguished Mullane and Mathews in 
Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002), stating: 
The Mathews balancing test was first conceived in the context of a due process 
challenge to the adequacy of administrative procedures used to terminate Social 
Security disability benefits. Although we have since invoked Mathews to evaluate due 
process claims in other contexts . . . we have never viewed Mathews as announcing an 
all-embracing test for deciding due process claims. Since Mullane was decided, we have 
regularly turned to it when confronted with questions regarding the adequacy of the 
method used to give notice. 
Id. at 167–68 (citation omitted). Nonetheless, some scholars argue that procedural due process 
requirements in class actions are governed by Mathews, not Mullane. See, e.g., Rachel Cantor, 
Comment, Internet Service of Process: A Constitutionally Adequate Alternative?, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 943, 949–50 (1999) (arguing that Mathews applies to class notice queries); Ehrlich, supra 
note 27, at 2179 (same).  
 110. Don Zupanec, Class Actions—Notice Costs—Payment by Defendant, 24 FED. 
LITIGATOR 7 (June 2009); accord George Rutherglen, Better Late Than Never: Notice and Opt 
Out at the Settlement Stage of Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258, 258 (1996) (“[C]ourts 
currently require early individual notice in (b)(3) class actions . . . .”). 
 111. See CHRISTINE P. BARTHOLOMEW, CLASS NOTICE STUDY (on file with Duke Law 
Journal) (finding 188 class certification decisions versus 1274 settlement notice orders). These 
settlement orders overwhelmingly covered both class and settlement notice. 
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oft-repeated presumptions that standards for (b)(3) classes are more 
demanding than for (b)(1) or (b)(2) classes.112 
With foundational assumptions cleared away, this Article focuses 
squarely on E-Notice—interweaving quantitative data results with a 
qualitative review of the underlying cases. This Part exposes a judiciary 
holding fast to mailed notice as the ideal. It also answers why courts 
are not embracing E-Notice, even though the Supreme Court’s 
standard for constitutional notice anticipates change. Finally, this Part 
details three interpretative barriers to E-Notice rooted in unwarranted 
fears: fear of change, fear of technology, and, perhaps most oddly, fear 
of imperfection. 
A. Fear of Changing Traditional Notice 
At first blush, the findings may seem promising. During the 
thirteen-year period studied, E-Notice grew by 30 percent113: as shown 
in Figure A, decisions approving some form of E-Notice beyond 
settlement websites grew from 2 percent in 2005 to 32 percent in 2017. 
 
Figure A. E-Notice Growth 
 
This temporal shift occurred across procedural contexts. As 
Figure B illustrates, courts are more inclined to approve E-Notice at 
 
 112. Supra Part I.B and accompanying notes.  
 113. See BARTHOLOMEW, CLASS NOTICE STUDY, supra note 111. 
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settlement.114 Yet, the difference between procedural contexts is 
nominal. 
 
Figure B. E-Notice by Procedural Context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, a closer examination of the data suggests a form of 
judicial neophobia clouds class notice decisions. Despite claims to the 
contrary,115 class notice plans are anachronistic. Of the cases analyzed, 
76 percent approve notice by direct mail, publication through 
magazines or newspapers, or a settlement webpage.116 Only 1 percent 
 
 114. Id.  
 115. See supra INTRODUCTION and accompanying text.  
 116. See BARTHOLOMEW, CLASS NOTICE STUDY, supra note 111; see also Dewey v. 
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2012); Dick v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 
297 F.R.D. 283, 292 (W.D. Ky. 2014); Pension Tr. Fund for Operating Eng’rs v. Assisted Living 
Concepts, Inc., No. 12-CV-884-JPS, 2013 WL 12180866, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 25, 2013); Beaulieu 
v. EQ Indus. Servs., Inc., No. 5:06-CV-00400-BR, 2009 WL 2208131, at *1 (E.D.N.C. July 22, 
2009). Such websites provide copies of both the long and short form notices. See, e.g., 
DOLLARSFORDISKDRIVES.COM, https://www.dollarsfordiskdrives.com [https://perma.cc/7JDV-
2KKX] (settlement website for antitrust litigation involving optical disc drive (“ODD”) suppliers, 
In re Optical Disk Drive Antitrust Litig., No. 3:10–MD–2143 RS, 2011 WL 3894376 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 3, 2011) and In re Optical Disk Drive Antitrust Litig., No. 3:10–MD–2143 RS, 2012 WL 
1366718 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2012)); GORDON V. HAIN CELESTIAL, www.GordonSettlement.com 
[https://perma.cc/UB59-EVUK] (settlement website for Lori D. Gordon v. The Hain Celestial 
Group, et al., No. 1:16-cv-06526-KBF (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2017)); SOTO V. WILD PLANET FOODS 
INC., https://www.wildplanetsettlement.com/Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/7MAV-D442] 
(settlement website for Soto v. Wild Planet Foods Inc., No. 5:15-cv-05082 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2017) 
and Shihad v. Wild Planet Foods Inc., No. 1:16-cv-01478 (N.D. Cal.)). Many of these settlement 
pages include online claim forms. See, e.g.,  DOLLARSFORDISKDRIVES.COM.  
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of plans deviate completely from these preferred mediums.117 
This trend suggests a misapplication of precedent. Stare decisis 
supports changing modes of notice over time. As detailed in Part I.A, 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that procedural due process 
standards are case specific.118 Even the “best practicable” language 
itself invites a flexible evaluation of what is practicable.119 However, 
parties in prior appellate decisions primarily used traditional notice 
methods without judicial objection, making some lower courts 
apprehensive to deviate.120 Rather than embracing the Supreme 
Court’s flexible standard and following its rationale, courts focus on 
the mode of notice in past cases. 
This focus on the fact application in prior high court decisions 
comes at a cost to E-Notice. It perverts the Court’s articulated 
procedural due process standard: lower courts simply use mailed notice 
as a short-hand substitute for the nuanced analysis called for by 
Mullane.121 A recent landowner class action illustrates this 
questionable approach. In Fager v. CenturyLink,122 the Tenth Circuit 
 
 117. See BARTHOLOMEW, CLASS NOTICE STUDY, supra note 111 (coding class notice 
decisions by notice method). 
 118. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (“Due process, as this Court often 
has said, is a flexible concept that varies with the particular situation.”); Schweiker v. McClure, 
456 U.S. 188, 200 (1982) (“Due Process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands.” (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972))); Lassiter 
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 35 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing how 
“the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment permitted a flexible, case-by-case 
determination”). 
 119. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (c)(2)(B); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) 
(“The notice must be the best practicable, ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections.’” (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 
(1950))). 
 120. See, e.g., DeJulius v. New England Health Care Emps. Pension Fund, 429 F.3d 935, 947 
(10th Cir. 2005) (approving a settlement that used mail, newspaper, and website notice); Zimmer 
Paper Prods., Inc. v. Berger & Montague, P.C., 758 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1985) (“It is well settled 
that in the usual situation first-class mail and publication in the press fully satisfy the notice 
requirements of both FED. R. CIV. P. 23 and the due process clause.”) (citation omitted); In re 
Gypsum Antitrust Cases, 565 F.2d 1123, 1127 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding it “fair and reasonable” 
to provide notice by mail and publication). 
 121. See supra Part I.A (discussing Mullane). While this article focuses on notice in federal 
courts, state courts likely share a default preference to mailed notice. See, e.g., West v. Carfax, 
Inc., No. 2008-T-0045, 2009 WL 5064143, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2009) (“We agree with 
appellants that, pursuant to Eisen, the notice provided in this case was defective. Courts have 
required notice by mail in class actions when the names and last known addresses of customers 
were available from a defendant’s own business records.”) (citation omitted). 
 122. Fager v. CenturyLink Commc’ns, LLC, 854 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 2016). 
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approved mailed settlement notice while disregarding the flexibility 
and creative inquiry required by Mullane.123 Instead of analyzing 
whether the proposed plan was reasonably calculated to reach class 
members, the court simply stated: “The Supreme Court has 
consistently endorsed notice by first-class mail. In 1985 it held that ‘a 
fully descriptive notice . . . sent first-class mail to each class 
member . . . satisfies due process.’”124 
More fundamentally, though, this holding misunderstands 
precedent. The Supreme Court has not “endorsed” any particular form 
of notice.125 While the Court has approved mailed-notice plans, it has 
never prescribed any one mode.126 Rather, the Court mandated 
individualized notice where practicable127—not necessarily mailed 
notice. Similarly, the Court approved constructive notice when 
individualized notice proves impracticable128—though it did not restrict 
constructive notice to hard-copy publication. 
Reducing procedural due process notice options to mail and hard 
copy publication creates problems. The oversimplification of Mullane 
leads courts to overlook innovative class notice options. In every 
circuit, courts approve mail or hard copy publication without 
considering E-Notice alternatives.129 Thus, as shown in Figure C, E-
Notice rates are unsurprisingly stunted across all circuits. 
 
 123. Id. At 1173. 
 124. Id. (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 812). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See, e.g., Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319 (explaining notice must be “reasonably calculated to 
reach those who could easily be informed by other means at hand”—not specifically mailed 
notice, per se).  
 127. Id. at 317 (“This Court has not hesitated to approve of resort to publication as a 
customary substitute in another class of cases where it is not reasonably possible or practicable to 
give more adequate warning.”). 
 128. Id.; see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974) (“[T]he court is 
required to direct to class members ‘the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including 
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.’” (quoting FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2))) (emphasis omitted). 
 129. See, e.g., Sonoma Cty. Ass’n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma Cty., No. CV 09-4432 CW, 2016 
WL 7743407, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2016); Kirven v. Cent. States Health & Life Co. of Omaha, 
No. 3:11-CV-2149-MBS, 2014 WL 12734325, at *9 (D.S.C. Dec. 12, 2014); Mims v. Wells Fargo 
Home Mortg., No. 4:07-CV-00014-WLS, 2014 WL 12701130, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2014); 
Beesley v. Int’l Paper Co., No. 06-703-DRH, 2013 WL 12171727, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2013); 
Chieftain Royalty Co. v. QEP Energy Co., No. CIV-11-212-R, 2013 WL 12090345, at *5 (W.D. 
Okla. May 31, 2013); Brody v. Merck & Co., No. 12-CV-4774-PGS-DEA, 2012 WL 12905988, at 
*5–6 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2012); Assif v. Titleserv, Inc., 288 F.R.D. 18, 26 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Franklin 
v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 3:10 CV 91, 2011 WL 3557033, at *12 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2011); 
Ridgely v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, No. CIV. 07-2146, 2010 WL 5140833, at *3 (E.D. La. 
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Figure C. E-Notice by Circuit130 
 
Opinions—particularly for settlement approvals—frequently 
devote a mere passing sentence or two to the method of notice.131 In re 
MetLife Demutualization Litigation132 illustrates this cursory 
approach.133 In this securities class action, the Eastern District of New 
York approved settlement notice solely by newspaper.134 The decision 
notably ignores other E-Notice options. As the court explained, “In 
view of the millions of members of the class, notice to class members 
by individual postal mail, email, or radio or television advertisements, 
is neither necessary nor appropriate. The publication notice ordered is 
appropriate and sufficient in the circumstances.”135 Thus, for some 
lower courts, the fear of breaking the mold ties them steadfastly to 
 
Dec. 13, 2010); Bussie v. Allmerica Fin. Corp., No. CIV.A. 97-40204-NMG, 2006 WL 8201933, at 
*1 (D. Mass. Sept. 19, 2006). 
 130. The D.C. and Federal Circuits are intentionally omitted, given the small sample size for 
each. See BARTHOLOMEW CLASS NOTICE STUDY, supra note 111 (coding notice decisions by 
circuit).  
 131. See, e.g., In re Chinese-Mfrd. Drywall Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2047, 2017 WL 
1421627, at *15 (E.D. La. Apr. 21, 2017) (addressing a notice plan summarily) appeal dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction, No. 17-30432, 2017 WL 5624275 (5th Cir. June 26, 2017); Ridgely, 2010 
WL 5140833, at *3 (devoting one sentence to notice); Coffin v. Bowater Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 
(D. Me. 2005) (same).  
 132. In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 262 F.R.D. 205 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 133. Id. at 208. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id.  
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mailed notice; as one attorney has stated, mailed notice is appropriate 
because “that’s the way it has always been done.”136 
The FJC perpetuates this fear of change. Its Judges’ Class Action 
Notice and Claims Process Checklist starts by equating mail with the 
ideal form of notice.137 The Checklist then cautions judges to be wary 
of E-Notice plans, warning the “[r]each, awareness, and claims will 
likely be very low when such a program is complete.”138 Notably, the 
FJC neither provides empirical foundation for this warning nor 
compares the reach of E-Notice to other forms of constructive notice.139 
Then, in the Manual of Complex Litigation, the FJC treats E-
Notice as distinct from the “preferred” methods of notice, stating: 
“When the names and addresses of most class members are known, 
notice by mail usually is preferred.”140 This “preferred” label tracks the 
observable trend in case law. As shown in Figure D, E-Notice is 
primarily limited to large class sizes, where individualized notice is less 
practicable. 
 
Figure D. E-Notice by Class Size 
 
 136. See, e.g., In re Scotts EZ Seeds Litig., No. 12 CV 4727(VB), 2015 WL 5502053, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2015).  
 137. CHECKLIST, supra note 24, at 2 (“If names and addresses are reasonably identifiable, 
Rule 23(c)(2) requires individual notice. Be careful to look closely at assertions that mailings are 
not feasible.”). 
 138. Id. at 4. 
 139. The pending FTC study may remedy this gap. See supra note 20. To help with this study, 
the data from this Article has been offered to the FTC for use.  
 140. ANN. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIG. § 33.26 (4th ed. 2017). 
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Again, the FJC does not justify perpetuating this preference for 
mail. Instead, the Manual references online notice as a mere 
“supplement,” further reinforcing the status quo.141 
E-Notice will only increase when courts and parties venture from 
their comfort zone. A binary definition of individualized notice—a 
mail or bust approach—runs contrary to the intended flexibility 
envisioned by the Court in fulfilling this constitutional protection. 
Thus, overcoming judicial fear of change is a necessary first step. 
B. Fear of “New” Technologies 
A second fear plagues E-Notice: a fear of “new” technologies. 
Interestingly, privacy concerns are rarely raised as rationale for 
denying E-Notice.142 Rather, some courts worry E-Notice may be 
ineffective or misused, and consequently only insist on traditional 
notice methods. For other courts, this fear leads to lukewarm, limited 
E-Notice approval. Either approach contributes to a continuing gap 
between the growth of E-Notice and society’s general use of 
technology. 
Although no appellate court has voiced concerns about abuse, 
some trial courts fret someone might alter electronic forms of notice. 
For example, in Karvaly v. eBay,143 the Eastern District of New York 
rejected a plan to use email as individualized notice to a class of 
payment account holders.144 The court recognized email was “clearly 
more convenient and less expensive for the parties,”145 but worried 
that: 
[N]otification by electronic mail creates risks of distortion or 
misleading notification that are substantially reduced when first-class 
mail is used. . . . 
 
 141. Id. § 21.311. 
 142. This finding was somewhat surprising given concerns about the use of Big Data. See, e.g., 
MARK BARTHOLOMEW, ADCREEP 71–77 (2017); BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-
ENGINEERING HUMANITY 21–28 (2018). Such concerns are warranted and invite further 
scholarship to explore this area. In a way, though, the proverbial cat is already out of the bag. 
Companies already gather information on consumers’ identities and preferences. Rather than 
ignore it out of privacy concerns, perhaps its existence has a silver lining: it is a way to increase 
the accuracy and utility of E-Notice methods. Further, claims administrators already have access 
to confidential information in cases, including private financial information. Hence, borrowing 
best practices from existing data sources may provide a path forward. 
 143. Karvaly v. eBay, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 71 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 144. Id. at 91. 
 145. Id. 
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[E]lectronic communication inherently has the potential to be copied 
and forwarded to other people via the internet with commentary that 
could distort the notice approved by the Court. Electronic mail 
heightens the risk that the communication will be reproduced to large 
numbers of people who could compromise the integrity of the notice 
process. In addition, email messages could be forwarded to nonclass 
members and posted to internet sites with great ease.146 
Given these fears, the court required mailed notice. However, the same 
risks apply to traditional mail: Mail can be altered, “copied and 
forwarded to other people.”147 It also can be “reproduced to large 
numbers of people” or scanned and “posted to internet sites with great 
ease.”148 Such risks have not limited mail notice, nor should they 
preclude E-Notice—yet they do. 
 Other courts dismiss these concerns as “outdated.”149 These 
courts recognize that encryption or locking attachments as PDF 
documents can alleviate such concerns.150 Yet, although the data 
suggests that courts are slowly modernizing, the technology lag 
continues, particularly for constructive notice. 
 
 146. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reab v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 214 F.R.D. 623, 
630–31); see also Kuznyetsov v. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc., Civ. A. No. 09-CV-379, 2009 
WL 1515175, at *6 (W.D. Pa. June 1, 2009) (repeating such fears and holding that “first-class mail 
is appropriate as the sole form of notice.”); cf. Vargas v. Gen. Nutrition Ctrs., Inc., No. 2:10-CV-
867, 2012 WL 5336166, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2012) (“Plaintiffs have not offered any persuasive 
justification that notification by first-class mail would be inadequate . . . .”).  
 147. Reab, 214 F.R.D. at 630; cf. Karvaly, 245 F.R.D. at 91 (“[N]otification by electronic mail 
creates risks of distortion or misleading notification that are substantially reduced when first-class 
mail is used.”).  
 148. Reab, 214 F.R.D. at 631. 
 149. Peterson v. Alaska Commc’ns Sys. Grp., Inc., No. 3:12-CV-00090-TMB, 2015 WL 
13376562, at *2 (D. Alaska Feb. 4, 2015) (“[T]he reasoning identified in cases that have limited 
distribution to U.S. mail is outdated.”); see also Jaso v. Bulldog Connection Specialists LLC, No. 
2:15-CV-269, 2015 WL 11144603, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2015) (“Sending a paper notice does 
not afford the same amount of protection from further dissemination and commentary today, 
however, for a recipient with a smart phone can easily snap a picture of a paper notice and 
disseminate it electronically with commentary.”); Browning v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 
04CV01463(HRL), 2007 WL 4105971, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2007) (finding that “[e]mail notice 
was particularly suitable” because the claim arose from visits to the defendant’s website) (citing 
cases).  
 150. See, e.g., Lewis v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, No. C2-11-CV-0058, 2011 WL 8960489, at *2 
(S.D. Ohio June 20, 2011) (“If the Notice were attached to the email as a pdf file rather than typed 
into the body of the email, the risk that the Notice will be ’copied and forwarded to other people 
via the internet with commentary . . . distort[ing] the notice approved by the Court’ . . . would be 
mitigated.”) (citation omitted); but see Chavez v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc., No. CV-09-4812 SC, 
2012 WL 6115611, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2012) (“Restricting access to the proposed website by 
requiring passwords which could be easily lost or forgotten would only undermine the Court’s 
goal of providing the best notice practicable.”). 
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As Figure E shows, of the various types of E-Notice in use, email 
exceeded all other forms of E-notice combined.151 During the study 
period, courts relied on this form of individual notice in 16 percent of 
cases.152 
 
Figure E. Type of E-Notice Ordered 
 
Technology is now part of everyday life. Smart devices allow 
constant delivery of email—a mode of communication that grows even 
in the shadow of instant messaging, texting, and social media.153 Eighty-
nine percent of Americans read their email daily, but class notice by 
email is still a rarity154—courts rely on email to provide individual 
notice in less than one in five cases.155 Similarly, smart device ownership 
is rising dramatically,156 with the number of smartphones doubling 
 
 151. See BARTHOLOMEW CLASS NOTICE STUDY, supra note 111.  
 152. Id.  
 153. THE RADICATI GROUP, EMAIL STATISTICS REPORT 2017–2021 (Feb.  
2017), https://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Email-Statistics-Report-2017-
2021-Executive-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6AH-Z3JP].  
 154. 22 New Stats Showing How American Adults Use Email, ELEVENTY MARKETING 
GROUP (Jan. 5, 2016) http://eleventygroup.com/2016/01/05/american-email-usage 
[https://perma.cc/6J4V-WK3X].  
 155. BARTHOLOMEW CLASS NOTICE STUDY, supra note 111 (coding cases by method of 
notice). 
 156. In 2016, roughly 25 percent of Americans owned an e-reader and 50 percent of 
Americans owned tablets. PEW RES. CTR., supra note 16.  
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since just 2011.157 These devices create connectivity to social networks 
previously inconceivable, radically transforming communication. The 
majority of Americans now get their news from social media.158 Hard-
copy newspaper readership159 and circulation160 are in rapid decline.161 
Yet, E-Notice through social media occurs in only 8 percent of cases.162 
Given these figures, perhaps it is unsurprising a gap persists 
between the growth of E-Notice and society’s general use of 
technology, as illustrated by Figure F. One pragmatic, though perhaps 
perfunctory, explanation could be what law and technology scholars 
call the “law lag”—the idea that “existing legal provisions are 
inadequate to deal with a social, cultural or commercial context created 
by rapid advances in information and communication 
technology . . . .”163 
 
 
 157. Jacob Poushter, Smartphones are Common in Advanced Economies, but Digital Divides 
Remain, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 21, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/ 
04/21/smartphones-are-common-in-advanced-economies-but-digital-divides-remain [https:// 
perma.cc/38AB-BEYB].  
 158. Michael Barthel, Newspapers: Fact Sheet, in PEW RES. CTR., STATE OF THE NEWS 
MEDIA 2016, at 9 (June 15, 2016), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
sites/13/2016/06/30143308/state-of-the-news-media-report-2016-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LFP-
EEBC] (reporting that since 2004 more than 100 newspapers have stopped providing daily issues). 
 159. See, e.g., Mathew Ingram, Print Readership is Still Plummeting, and Paywalls Aren’t 
Really Helping, FORTUNE (June 1, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/06/01/print-readership-
paywalls [https://perma.cc/JN3H-RW6R] (discussing a report finding a 25 percent drop in print 
newspaper readership between 2011 and 2015); cf. Barthel, supra note 158, at 11 (noting “the 
portion of Americans turning to print newspapers continues to decline,” though most self-
reported newsreaders still rely on print). 
 160. See, e.g., Barthel, supra note 158, at 9 (“For newspapers, 2015 might as well have been a 
recession year. Weekday circulation fell 7% and Sunday circulation fell 4%, both showing their 
greatest declines since 2010.”); Dan Kennedy, Opinion, Print Is Dying, Digital Is No Savior: The  
Long, Ugly Decline Of The Newspaper Business Continues Apace, WGBH (Jan.  
26, 2016), https://www.wgbh.org/news/2016/01/26/local-news/print-dying-digital-no-savior-long-
ugly-decline-newspaper-business-continues [https://perma.cc/5WHZ-Y79V] (“[P]rint circulation 
plunged between 2013 and 2015 at a far faster rate than had been expected. The Journal is down 
by 400,000; the Times by 200,000; The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times by 100,000.”). 
 161. Cf. Derek Thompson, The Print Apocalypse and How to Survive It, ATLANTIC (Nov.  
3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/11/the-print-apocalypse-and-how-to-
survive-it/506429 [https://perma.cc/D98Q-PP4F] (discussing the demise of newspapers); see also 
Klonoff, supra note 27, at 731–32 (“[P]eople do not read the newspaper as often or as diligently 
as they once did.”). 
 162. BARTHOLOMEW CLASS NOTICE STUDY, supra note 111.  
 163. Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized 
Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191, 202 (2016) (defining 
law lags). 
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Figure F. E-Notice vs. Internet Use 
 
This lag is not unique to class notice.164 However, with class notice, 
it seems more than a mere lag is at play. For example, threads of the 
judiciary simply assume E-Notice is dangerous or flawed.165 Once 
again, language from the FJC fosters such fears: 
Audiences of Internet websites are measured by “impressions.” 
Total, or “gross,” impressions of the entire website do not reveal how 
many people will view the notice “ad” appearing periodically on a 
particular page. Inflated audience data via Internet ads is common. It 
is very expensive to reach a significant percentage of a mass audience 
with Internet banner ads. Watch for suggestions that Internet ads and 
social network usage can replace all other methods. Reach, 
 
 164. See, e.g., Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright 
Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831, 1840 (2009) (discussing the technological gap between law and 
copyright); Thomas R. McLean, The Offshoring of American Medicine: Scope, Economic Issues 
and Legal Liabilities, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 205, 207 (2005) (discussing how “international law 
and the legal ‘lag phase’ associated with technology leaves many unanswered questions on 
cyberspace medical malpractice”); Sean B. Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1491, 
1513 (2011) (“[P]atent law inevitably lags a step or two behind the cutting edge of science 
and technology.”).  
 165. See, e.g., Kuznyetsov v. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 09-CV-379, 
2009 WL 1515175, at *6 (W.D. Pa. June 1, 2009) (holding “that first-class mail is appropriate as 
the sole form of notice” in part because of fears of alteration). 
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awareness, and claims will likely be very low when such a program is 
complete.166 
Yet class notice experts are more sanguine. For example, Richard 
Simmons, the president of a well-respected claims-administration 
company, is willing to “assume that digital banner advertisements, 
when properly employed, can be used in a holistic program to provide 
adequate notice to class members regarding a settlement.”167 Similarly, 
Steven Weisbrot, another nationally recognized class action notice 
expert, recently urged the Rules Committee “to explicitly endorse the 
use of banner ads in notifying unknown class members.”168 
These experts recognize that while the parameters of E-Notice 
plans need careful consideration, such plans have been successful.169 
Though few published decisions include detailed data, the information 
available suggests the reach and claims rates from E-Notice plans are 
on par with or higher than traditional class notice methods.170 Further, 
 
 166. CHECKLIST, supra note 24, at 4. 
 167. Richard Simmons & Christian Clapp, Crafting Digital Class Notices That Actually 
Provide Notice, LAW 360 (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/769290/crafting-
digital-class-notices-that-actually-provide-notice [https://perma.cc/8XEW-MFRB]. 
 168. Steven Weisbrot, Is Digital the New Print in Class Action Notification Programs?, AM.  
BAR ASS’N (Feb. 19, 2015), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/classactions/ 
articles/winter2015-0215-is-digital-the-new-print-in-class-action-notification-programs.html 
[https://perma.cc/UGT3-MGUX]. 
 169. Admittedly, some plans work better than others. See, e.g., Michael Brenner, Banners 
Have 99 Problems and a Click Ain’t One, MKTG. INSIDER GRP. (Jan. 30, 2017), https:// 
marketinginsidergroup.com/content-marketing/banners-99-problems/ [https://perma.cc/E2RM-
M4MG] (detailing variances in banner ad effectiveness); see also Scheibel, supra note 10, at 1358 
(“Measurements of impressions would likely be more meaningful if the notice was published in 
targeted places that made sense in the context, or, to recall Rule 23(c)(2)(B)’s direction, the 
circumstances, of the suit.”). E-Notice should squarely target class members and provide repeated 
exposure to the notice. Id. Further, it is not sufficient to merely design and then launch an E-
Notice plan. Rather, claims administrators should affirmatively manage plans and be willing to 
make adjustments as necessary to ensure “the best notice practicable.” Id. 
 170. Compare, e.g., In re Carrier IQ, Inc., Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 12-MD-02330-EMC, 
2016 WL 4474366, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2016) (reaching 81.3 percent through publication and 
social media notice) (subsequent history omitted) and LaGarde v. Support.com, Inc., No. C12-
0609 JSC, 2013 WL 1283325, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (“Notice to the class was delivered 
via e-mail, reaching more than 92% of the 759,000 class members’ email addresses.”) and Cohorst 
v. BRE Props., Inc., No. 3:10-CV-2666-JM-BGS, 2011 WL 7061923, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 
2011) (using email and publication generated a 95.35 percent receipt rate ), report and 
recommendation adopted as modified, No. 10CV2666 JM BGS, 2012 WL 153754 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 
18, 2012), with Domonoske v. Bank of Am., N.A., 790 F. Supp. 2d 466, 472 (W.D. Va. 2011) 
(providing notice by mail to 86.7 percent of the class) and Vaughn v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 627 
F. Supp. 2d 738, 744 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (providing mailed notice to approximately 91 percent of 
class members), order amended sub nom., Vaughn v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 507 F.3d 295 (5th 
Cir. 2007). 
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in cases combining traditional and E-Notice methods, claims rates 
often exceed those derived from traditional notice methods alone.171 
Nonetheless, some courts ignore these successes. Take, for 
example, the actions of the District of Kansas in In re Motor Fuel 
Temperature Sales Practices Litigation.172 As part of a settlement notice 
plan, plaintiffs proposed using a banner ad on highly frequented 
websites to provide constructive notice.173 This banner ad campaign 
was crafted to provide notice “where at least 75 percent of the target 
population has Internet access.”174 Where Internet access fell below 
that threshold, plaintiffs proposed publication notice and a settlement 
website. Despite other successful banner ad plans,175 the court refused 
to approve the plan, fearing class members would never “actually click 
on the banner ads”176 The court was “skeptical whether a notice 
program based primarily on banner ads” could ever satisfy Rule 23.177 
Such statements suggest judicial fear of E-Notice may stem from 
a more fundamental misunderstanding. Click-through rates are only a 
partial measure of the impact of online ads.178 Instead, a more relevant 
metric is conversion rate—the percentage of individuals who actually 
 
 171. Consumer class actions generate some of the lowest claims rates. However, use of E-
Notice helps drive up these figures. Compare, e.g., Gascho v. Glob. Fitness Holdings, LLC, 822 
F.3d 269, 290 (6th Cir. 2016) (using a combination of traditional and E-Notice to generate 8 
percent claims rate), cert. denied sub nom. Zik v. Gascho, 137 S. Ct. 1065 (2017); Date v. Sony 
Elecs., Inc., No. 07-15474, 2013 WL 3945981, at *9 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2013) (using a combination 
of traditional and E-Notice, class notice resulted in a 4 percent claims rate), with Touhey v. United 
States, No. EDCV 08–01418, 2011 WL 3179036, at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2011) (finding a 2 
percent response rate acceptable—38 responses out of 1875 mailed notices). 
 172. In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., No. 07-MD-1840-KHV, 2013 WL 
139732, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 10, 2013). 
 173. Id.  
 174. Id.  
 175. See, e.g., In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1122, 1129 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015) (approving “(1) internet-based notice using paid banner ads targeted at potential class 
members (in English and in Spanish on Spanish-language websites); (2) notice via ‘earned media’ 
or, in other words, through articles in the press; (3) a website decided solely to the settlement (in 
English and Spanish versions); and (4) a toll-free telephone number where class members can 
obtain additional information and request a class notice.”); In re Nat’l Arbitration Forum Trade 
Practices Litig., No. 10-2122, 2011 WL 13135575, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 8, 2011) (“Plaintiffs note 
that the banner ads regarding the settlement were viewed 190 million times, and that the website 
set up for the administration of the settlement received more than 100,000 ‘clicks.’”). 
 176. In re Motor Fuel, 2013 WL 139732, at *2. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Michael Agger, Responsible Browsing, Will Clicking on All the Ads Help Your Favorite  
Web Site?, SLATE (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/lifehacking/2009/09/
responsible_browsing.html [https://perma.cc/Q3Z7-EL89] (reporting how marketers view click-
through rates as “a crude measurement that doesn’t really capture an ad’s impact.”).  
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take action after viewing an ad.179 As research on online ads confirms, 
even in the absence of clicks, such ads still “reach” individuals—and do 
so quite effectively.180 
 Despite courts’ general reluctance to adopt E-Notice, the data 
did identify a segment of cases in which E-Notice is more common. In 
cases involving technology services or products, courts turn to E-
Notice nearly twice as often, as Figure G depicts. 
 
Figure G. E-Notice in Cases Involving Technology Services or Products 
 
 179. See, e.g., Anindya Ghose and Sha Yang, An Empirical Analysis of Search Engine 
Advertising: Sponsored Search in Electronic Markets, 55 MANAGEMENT SCI. 1605, 1606 (2009) 
(distinguishing click-through and conversion rates).  
 180. Rex Briggs & Nigel Hollis, Advertising on the Web: Is There Response Before Click-
Through, 37.2 J. ADVERTISING RES. 2 (Mar.–Apr. 1997) (finding online advertising “works with  
or without the added benefit of click-through”); Robert Hof, Study: Mobile Ads Actually Do 
Work - Especially In Apps, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
roberthof/2014/08/27/study-mobile-ads-actually-do-work-especially-in-apps/#69462b8857aa 
[https://perma.cc/3MJH-YKPK] (featuring a recent research study by Medialets that tracked “the 
impact of ads that are seen but not clicked. Using that data, Medialets says, the rate at which ads 
prompt people to view a Web page rises 288%, while the rate for app downloads rises 162% and 
the rate for purchases rises 157%.”); Farhad Manjoo, Facebook Followed You to the Supermarket, 
SLATE (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2013/03/ 
facebook_advertisement_studies_their_ads_are_more_like_tv_ads_than_google.html [https:// 
perma.cc/JT9G-N4PQ] (“[T]he click doesn’t matter; people who click on ads aren’t necessarily 
buying, and people who are buying are almost certainly not clicking.”).  
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In these cases, the facts, rather than the presumed technological 
savvy of class members, control.181 For example, when a class member’s 
primary interaction with the defendant is through an electronic 
medium, E-Notice is likely.182 Take Evans v. Linden Research, Inc.,183 a 
class action involving participants in Second Life, an internet role-
playing game.184 Class members alleged the defendant unilaterally 
suspended their Second Life accounts without compensating them for 
virtual assets they purchased through the game. The Northern District 
of California approved a notice plan that relied exclusively on email 
and online notice.185 
In some of these cases, courts rely solely on E-Notice even when 
individualized mailed notice is possible. In doing so, they buck the 
more common trend of demoting E-Notice to a form of supplemental 
notice.186 For example, In re Electronic Books Antitrust Litigation187 
involved antitrust claims against e-book retailers including Amazon, 
Barnes & Noble, Apple, Kobo, Sony, and Google.188 The retailers 
obtained class members’ mailing addresses as part of the billing 
information.189 Nonetheless, the approved class notice relied primarily 
on email.190 The claims administrator only mailed notice to 
“class members for whom no correct e-mail address was found in the 
two prior rounds of notice.”191 
 
 181. See, e.g., Douglas v. W. Union Co., No. 14-cv-1741, 2015 WL 9302316, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. 
Nov. 10, 2015); Flynn v. Sony Elecs., Inc., No. 09-CV-2109-BAS MDD, 2015 WL 128039, at *1 
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2015) (using E-Notice in a case involving defective notebook computers); 
Mirakay v. Dakota Growers Pasta Co., Inc., No. 13-cv-4429, 2014 WL 5358987, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 
20, 2014). 
 182. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Palace Entm’t Holdings, LLC, No. CIV.A. 11-987, 2012 WL 27461, 
at *6 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2012) (approving notice plan including email because email was the 
primary form of communication between class members and defendants). 
 183. Evans v. Linden Research, Inc., No. C-11-01078, 2013 WL 5781284 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 25, 
2013). 
 184. Id. at *1. 
 185. Id. at *3. 
 186. In re TracFone Unlimited Serv. Plan Litig., No. 13-cv-03440, 2015 WL 13035125, at *2–3 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2015); Keirsey v. eBay, Inc., No. 12-cv-01200, 2014 WL 644697, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 14, 2014); In re Sony SXRD Rear Projection Television Class Action Litig., No. 06 CIV. 
5173 (RPP), 2008 WL 1956267, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2008). 
 187. In re Elec. Books Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MD 2293 DLC, 2014 WL 1641699 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 24, 2014). 
 188. Id. at *3. 
 189. Id. at *2. 
 190. Id. at *3. 
 191. Id.  
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Hence, cases involving technology are sometimes outliers, with 
courts more willing to experiment with E-Notice. However, despite 
these instances of experimentation, courts more commonly allow 
ungrounded fears about technology contribute to the slow growth of 
E-Notice. Without judicial willingness to consider the trade-offs 
between hypothetical abuse and verifiable gains, E-Notice will likely 
remain underutilized. When combined with judicial fears of change 
and imperfect tailoring, the reasons for E-Notice’s slow growth are 
clear. What to do about these barriers, however, is the subject of the 
next Part. 
C. Fear of Imprecision 
A third fear undermines E-Notice: fear of imprecision. Although 
parties must “reasonably calculate[]” notice plans to reach class 
members,192 this calculation, or tailoring, need not be perfect. The 
Supreme Court has long-blessed constructive notice, even though 
“[c]hance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an 
advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a 
newspaper.”193 
Nonetheless, a distorted understanding of this tailoring 
requirement leads some courts to forgo E-Notice. These courts worry 
broad notice “would unfairly publicize yet unproven allegations about 
defendants to their customers.”194 If allegations of wrongdoing are 
broadly shared, the argument goes, non-class members may learn 
about pending litigation, thereby harming defendants’ reputations.195 
 
 192. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–12 (1985) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 311 (1950); Gooch v. 
Life Inv’rs Ins. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 402, 423 (6th Cir. 2012); § 6 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 
§ 18:43 (5th ed. 2015). 
 193. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315. 
 194. See, e.g., Brooks v. GAF Materials Corp., No. 8:11-CV-00983-JMC, 2013 WL 2109559, at 
*2 (D.S.C. May 15, 2013) (rejecting the notice plan in a defective shingle case because the plaintiff 
proposed notifying “builders and distributors, who are customers of Defendant, receive notice of 
a class action to which they are not potential plaintiffs.”) (citation omitted); Owen v. W. Travel, 
Inc., No. C03-0659Z, 2003 WL 25961848 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 12, 2003). 
 195. Some courts fully reject such reputational-harm arguments. See, e.g., Lake Butler 
Apparel Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 519 F.2d 84, 89 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The posting of the notice does 
not by any stretch of the imagination reflect one way or the other on the views of the employer.”); 
Pacheco v. Aldeeb, No. 5:14-CV-121-DAE, 2015 WL 1509570, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2015) 
(recognizing courts have approved various notice plans “over objections that such publication 
could cause reputational harm”); In re Elec. Books Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MD 2293 (DLC), 2014 
WL 1641699, at *4–6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2014) (rejecting Apple’s claim of potential reputational 
harm from a multifront E-Notice plan); Barajas v. Acosta, No. CIV.A. H-11-3862, 2012 WL 
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To insulate defendants from this imagined risk, some courts carefully 
circumscribe notice.196 Unlike reticence toward changing methods of 
notice, the problem here is not judicial inaction, but rather over-
reaction. Unrealistic perfection has become the enemy of the good.197 
The data evidences a concern that class plans might reach too 
many individuals—including non-class members. This concern is 
growing with the rise of an implied ascertainability requirement. 
Courts are denying certification rather than considering E-Notice 
solutions. For example, in LaBauve v. Olin,198 recreational anglers 
impacted by chemical run-off sought certification of an environmental 
class action.199 To identify class members, plaintiffs proposed using a 
database of fishing licenses.200 However, the Southern District of 
Alabama found the class unascertainable.201 The Court disregarded 
constructive notice as a viable option, opting instead to deny 
certification.202 The court worried such a plan “may be both 
overinclusive and underinclusive in identifying class members, as not 
all of them may read the paper and certain people may respond to 
 
1952261, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 30, 2012) (“[T]he notice informs potential plaintiffs of the action 
and their rights to join the lawsuit. The notice will not prejudice the rights of Defendants, and it 
does not purport to assert their position about the litigation.”); Simpkins v. Pulte Home Corp., 
No. 608-CV-130-ORL-19DAB, 2008 WL 3927275, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2008) (rejecting a 
challenge to class notice because defendant “offers no case-specific explanation of how it will 
suffer harm in this case”). 
 196. Much like the fear of change, the Manual for Complex Litigation plays a part in fueling 
the fear of overly broad notice. In discussing notice through defendant’s own mailings, the Manual 
states: 
Defendant may object that requiring it to use its own mailings to announce the 
certification of a class against it may be prejudicial and may even deprive it of First 
Amendment rights. It is important to balance any efficiencies that might be gained by 
this approach against the burden such mailings can impose. Before requiring a 
defendant to use its own mailings to provide certification notice, the court should 
require class counsel to show the absence of feasible alternatives. 
ANN. MANUAL COMPLEX LIT. § 21.311 (4th ed. 2017). Such defendant-orientated concerns 
detract from a focus on protecting class members. 
 197. Cf. Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub 
nom. ConAgra Brands, Inc. v. Briseno, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017) (“As the Seventh Circuit put it, 
‘[w]hen it comes to protecting the interests of absent class members, courts should not let the 
perfect become the enemy of the good.’” (quoting Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 
666 (7th Cir. 2015))), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016). 
 198. LaBauve v. Olin Corp., 231 F.R.D. 632 (S.D. Ala. 2005). 
 199. Id. at 641. 
 200. Id. at 684. 
 201. Id. at 662. 
 202. Id. at 684. 
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publication notice even though they were not fishing in the particular 
area of concern during the particular temporal interval of concern.”203 
As the implied ascertainability requirement spreads,204 the 
judiciary is moving incrementally closer to requiring actual notice.205 
This move compromises constructive notice, including E-Notice 
options. Consider, for example, E-Notice in the Third Circuit.206 As 
Figure H shows, E-Notice slowed shortly after the court adopted the 
ascertainability requirement in 2012.207 The court doubled down on the 
requirement in 2013 and 2014.208 Soon after, E-Notice use notably 
dipped. After 2015, when the court loosened the requirement slightly, 
E-Notice increased slightly before leveling off.209 
 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. See Hare, supra note 102 at 615 (discussing the “plethora of authority from various 
courts” on ascertainability).  
 205. See Luks, supra note 34 at 2371 (discussing the connection between notice and 
ascertainability).  
 206. The Third Circuit was the first to definitively require ascertainability. See Marcus v. 
BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012) (requiring that “the class must be currently 
and readily ascertainable based on objective criteria.”); accord Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
725 F.3d 349, 354–55 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 207. This drop is likely even greater than reflected here, as the analysis focuses on approved 
notice. As a result, it does not reflect cases where courts denied certification because of 
ascertainability concerns. See, e.g., Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 949–50 (11th 
Cir. 2015) (denying certification of purchasers of dietary supplements); Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 
727 F.3d 300, 307–12 (3d Cir. 2013) (same); Xavier v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 
1075, 1089–90 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (denying certification of a class of Marlboro smokers); Weiner v. 
Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742 (DLC), 2010 WL 3119452, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
5, 2010) (denying certification of Snapple beverages purchasers).  
 208. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 308 (affirming the ascertainability requirement); Marcus, 687 
F.3d at 609. 
 209. Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 170 (3d Cir. 2015) (finding class members’ 
ascertainability by reference to public records).  
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Figure H. Third Circuit E-Notice in Antitrust & Consumer Cases 
 
Fear of imprecision compromises E-Notice even beyond 
ascertainability cases. In some cases, defendants successfully narrow 
class certification notice by arguing reputational harm will occur if non-
class members learn about the alleged wrongdoing.210 As courts 
entertain such arguments, E-Notice usage stalls. For example, in 
Korrow v. Aaron’s,211 the plaintiffs proposed a multifront notice plan 
using mail, publication, and a hypertargeted Google AdWords 
campaign.212 The defendants challenged the Google ads, arguing 
instead for only direct mail or hard copy publication.213 Defendants 
asserted such notice would be “prejudicial and harmful to [their] 
business reputation” but provided no supporting evidence.214 The 
district court acknowledged, given the class demographic, “traditional 
forms of notice, such as direct mail or publications in regional 
newspapers, which are based on a class member’s previous residence, 
 
 210. See, e.g., Fraser v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-00520-TLN-DB, 2016 WL 
6208367, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2016) (narrowing potential methods of notice in an FLSA case 
because additional notice “would encourage inquiries by non-class members, which could 
interfere with Defendant’s reputation and business”); Murray v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 240 F.R.D. 
392, 401 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (staying notice to absent class members in Fair Credit Reporting Act case 
based on defendant E*Trade’s unsubstantiated claim that notice would “needlessly injure 
E*Trade’s reputation and good will” should defendant ultimately prevail on its motion for 
summary judgment). 
 211. Korrow v. Aaron’s Inc., No. CV 10-6317, 2015 WL 7720491 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2015). 
 212. Id. at *9. 
 213. Id. at *10.  
 214. Id. 
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may be ineffective.”215 Nonetheless, the Court accepted the 
defendant’s argument and ordered a narrower notice plan.216 
 This fear of imprecision undermines enforcement of cases most 
dependent on constructive notice—namely, antitrust and consumer 
class actions.217 Currently, these claims are more likely to trigger E-
Notice, as Figure I shows.218 
 
Figure I. E-Notice by Case Type 
 
Unlike say, an employment case, it is less likely a defendant in an 
antitrust or consumer case will have retained records necessary to 
enable mailed notice. Thus, as fear of imprecision grows, consumer and 
antitrust cases are most at risk. 
More fundamentally, though, fear of imprecision drives courts to 
prioritize unsubstantiated claims of harm over constitutional 
protection. Worrying that non-class members may learn about pending 
litigation improperly shifts the focus away from putative class 
members, even though class notice “is intended fundamentally as 
 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id.  
 217. Cf. Walters, supra note 1, at 4 (discussing the benefits of electronic notice in cases with 
wide-spread audiences). 
 218. See BARTHOLOMEW CLASS NOTICE STUDY, supra note 111; see also, e.g., In re Korean 
Ramen Antitrust Litig., No. C-13-04115-WHO, 2016 WL 8188743, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016) 
(approving E-Notice in an indirect purchaser antitrust case); Kelly v. Phiten USA, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 
564, 569 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (using E-Notice in a consumer class action).  
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protection of the class.”219 This shift is particularly questionable in the 
absence of proof of harm to the defendant220 and the strong 
governmental interest in providing such notice. 
Class notice is reasonably related to a government interest; 
namely, compliance with putative class members’ constitutional rights. 
Thus, the governmental interest in compelling such speech is 
substantial.221 Once such an interest exists, the defendant’s First 
Amendment protection is minimal.222 Generalized assertions of harm 
are insufficient.223 Yet, some courts insist on such tailoring, even 
without a defendant raising reputational concerns. In Jermyn v. Best 
Buy,224 the Southern District Court of New York certified a consumer 
class action alleging Best Buy failed to honor its price match policy.225 
 
 219. Advisory Committee Notes Jan. 17, 1963 (emphasis added); see also Whitlock v. FSL 
Mgmt., LLC, No. 3:10CV-00562-JHM, 2015 WL 13322438, at *3 (W.D. Ky. July 13, 2015) (“The 
purpose of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) is to protect the absent class members, not the defendants in a 
class action ‘who are in a position to protect their own interests during negotiations.’”).  
 220. Nor are defendants likely to have any actual evidence given consumer behavior. 
Consumers have a notably short memory when it comes to prior alleged or established 
wrongdoing, as is evident from Toyota and Firestone’s continued viability after proven wrong-
doing. This continued success suggests that it is not class notice that impacts a defendant’s long-
term reputation, but how the defendant responds to such allegations. See, e.g., Kim Bhasin, 9 PR 
Fiascos That Were Handled Brilliantly by Management, BUS. INSIDER (May 26, 2011), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/pr-disasters-crisis-management-2011-5 [https://perma.cc/A5H6-
3EK2] (detailing how corporate responses to crises impacted potential public perception of the 
company’s brand).  
 221. In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 141 F.R.D. 534, 552 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (finding 
“a substantial interest in assuring that the goals and requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure concerning class actions be implemented to protect the due process rights of all 
parties”).  
 222. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
 223. Cf. Montanez, et al. v. Gerber Childrenswear, LLC, et al., No. CV097-420DSFDTBX, 
2012 WL 12932032, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2012) (noting “[d]amage to reputation from 
a class notice is highly speculative given the prevalence of class action lawsuits, meritorious and 
not, against virtually any and all kinds of companies”). This is particularly true for class notice 
given its factual nature. Such notice does no more than alert putative class members of their legal 
rights. It includes specific caveats clarifying that defendants contest any wrongdoing, thus further 
minimizing any potential reputational harm. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[b]ecause the 
extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the 
value to consumers of the information such speech provides, . . . appellant’s constitutionally 
protected interest in not providing any particular factual information in his advertising is 
minimal.” Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; cf. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (“[M]andated disclosure of accurate, factual, commercial information does not offend 
the core First Amendment values of promoting efficient exchange of information or protecting 
individual liberty interests.”).  
 224. Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., No. 08 Civ. 002149(CM), 2010 WL 5187746 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 6, 2010). 
 225. Id. at *1. 
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Mailed individual notice was not possible because the defendant lacked 
class members’ addresses.226 In the alternative, the plaintiffs proposed 
using email and text for individual notice, as well as Twitter, the 
defendant’s website, and newspaper ads for constructive notice.227 
While the proposed individual notice would have reached class 
members, it also would have extended to other Best Buy customers not 
eligible for compensation. The court assumed “individual 
notice . . . creates a greater expectation than notice by publication,” 
and, therefore, “the plaintiffs should make every effort to provide such 
notice only to class members.”228 Based on this assumption, the court 
rejected any individualized E-Notice at all.229 Instead, it ordered solely 
newspaper publication and notice posted on Defendant’s website.230 
Ironically, by rejecting individualized E-Notice options, the Best 
Buy court sacrificed the narrowly targeted notice it desired. Individual 
E-Notice through email would have afforded an opportunity to reach 
purchasers during the class period. Even constructive E-Notice 
methods could have provided targeted notice. For example, Google 
banner ads can hypertarget231 a given demographic by using metadata 
to narrow geographic scope and microsegment users.232 Google also 
has access to between 70 and 80 percent of credit card purchase data, 
which in a consumer class can help microsegment class members.233 
Similarly, E-Notice through Facebook can narrowly target relevant 
class members. Ads on this platform can target a relevant segment 
 
 226. Id. at *4. 
 227. Id. at *2. 
 228. Id. at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pierce v. Novastar Mortg., 
Inc., 2007 WL 505670, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 12, 2007)). 
 229. Id. at *9.  
 230. Id. 
 231. CLARA SHIH, THE FACEBOOK ERA: TAPPING ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS TO MARKET, 
SELL, AND INNOVATE 40 (2d ed. 2011) (defining hypertargeting). 
 232. See id. at 114 (explaining how hypertargeting uses information like “location, gender, 
age, education, workplace, relationship status, relationship interests, and interest keywords” to 
“test and optimize” the audience reach).  
 233. See Chris Smith, Google Search Just Got a Lot More Personal, BGR (May 30, 2017), 
https://bgr.com/2017/05/30/google-search-personal-results-tab [https://perma.cc/XBW9-UNRP]. 
This is in addition to the extensive non-credit-card data Google collects. See, e.g., GREG CONTI, 
GOOGLING SECURITY: HOW MUCH DOES GOOGLE KNOW ABOUT YOU? 32 (2008) (listing the 
data vectors Google collects); Todd Haselton, How to Find Out What Google Knows About You 
and Limit the Data it Collects, CNBC (Nov. 20, 2017) https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/20/what-
does-google-know-about-me.html [https://perma.cc/LE9H-LSK9] (listing information Google 
collects, such as where users have traveled, their ages, and even when they have turned off their 
bedroom lights).  
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from the “more than 500 million people spending an astonishing 20 
billion minutes per day logged in.”234 It could identify users that 
perhaps, “checked into” a Best Buy or “liked” the company during the 
class period.235 By comparing existing metadata to the class definition, 
these ads can reach a more targeted demographic than publication 
notice—the primary fallback method for constructive notice. 
 Judicial uncertainty regarding the appropriate degree of precision 
needed for class notice encourages objectors. Objectors are almost 
twice as common in cases involving E-Notice,236 as Figure J illustrates. 
 
Figure J. Objection Rates 
 
 
 234. SHIH, supra note 231, at 4. This figure may even be higher, given the growth of older 
Facebook users. See Monica Anderson & Andrew Perrin, Tech Adoption Climbs Among Older 
Adults, PEW RES. INST. (May 17, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/05/17/tech-adoption-
climbs-among-older-adults [https://perma.cc/S4TS-GNPJ] (detailing the growth of technology 
use by older Americans); Shannon Greenwood et al., Social Media Update 2016, PEW RES. INST. 
(Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/11/social-media-update-2016/ [https:// 
perma.cc/SE2S-2WBD] (discussing “the growing number of older adults who are joining the 
site”). 
 235. See, e.g., Louise Matsakis, Facebook’s Targeted Ads Are More Complex Than It Lets On, 
WIRED (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/facebooks-targeted-ads-are-more-complex-
than-it-lets-on [https://perma.cc/RJ5B-K54R] (referencing the ability of a local bike shop to target 
female bicyclists in the area). 
 236. See BARTHOLOMEW, CLASS NOTICE STUDY, supra note 111. 
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Fruitful or otherwise, such objections risk chilling innovative 
notice methods. For example, in Cohorst v. BRE Properties, Inc.,237 the 
Southern District of California approved settlement notice after the 
parties reached a class settlement for claims that defendants 
improperly recorded telephone communications.238 Because the 
parties lacked mailing addresses for the “highly transitory” class 
members,239 they proposed email and newspaper publication notice.240 
Objectors challenged the settlement for failing to provide notice by 
mail.241 Ultimately, the court agreed to supplemental mailing for the 
small portion of the class which did not receive the email, but only after 
the judiciary and parties expended resources responding to the 
tailoring challenge.242 Rather than risk such challenges, parties may opt 
to pursue traditional methods of notice—even when those means are 
potentially less effective.243 
In sum, judicial fear of imprecision helps explain the limited 
growth of E-Notice. This fear contributes to courts restrictively 
defining available notice methods. The additional fears of change and 
technology only exacerbate this concern. The next question, then, is 
how to overcome these worries. 
III.  OVERCOMING FEAR OF E-NOTICE 
This Part proposes adjustments to the notice approval process to 
maximize judicial consideration of E-Notice by responding to judicial 
concerns. To be clear, the argument here is not wholesale replacement 
of mail and newspaper. For some demographics, email is not yet a true 
substitute for mail; nor would a Facebook ad be effective.244 But rigid 
 
 237. Cohorst v. BRE Props., Inc., No. 10CV2666 JM BGS, 2012 WL 153754 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 
18, 2012). 
 238. Id. at *2. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id.  
 241. Id.  
 242. Id. at *3. 
 243. See, e.g., O’Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 214 F.R.D. 266, 270–71 (E.D. Pa. 2003) 
(explaining how meritless objections “only succeeded in lengthening [the court’s] memorandum 
and unnecessarily requiring class counsel and the Defendant to expend additional resources”); 
Bruce D. Greenberg, Keeping the Flies Out of the Ointment: Restricting Objectors to Class Action 
Settlements, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 949, 967 (2010) (“Even a baseless objection can delay the 
implementation of a proposed settlement.”); cf. Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: 
Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 422 (2003) 
(discussing “meritless appeals by class action objectors” and judicial responses to them). 
 244. See THE CHANGING POSTAL AND DELIVERY SECTOR: TOWARDS A RENAISSANCE 5–8 
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adherence to the status quo sometimes causes courts to forego the 
“best notice practicable.”245 Even a modest switch—say, from hard-
copy newspaper ads to digital ads—could improve some notice plans. 
While the proposed amendment to the Rule 23 comments, 
discussed below, is a solid starting point,246 it will not cure judicial 
hesitation on its own. Rather, courts need to return to basics, actively 
engage in class notice determinations, and communicate notice plan 
decisionmaking. Combined, these practical solutions encourage courts 
to embrace the modern era and overcome the fear that cripples E-
Notice’s full potential. 
A. Acknowledging E-Notice’s Legitimacy 
First, in evaluating notice plans, courts should follow the spirit and 
rules of Mullane,247 not just the fact application. Law review articles 
frequently proffer radical revisions to legislation or new theories to 
reorient the law. E-Notice requires no such extreme measures. The 
working parts are all in place. The Supreme Court has already 
articulated a malleable standard.248 Congress has already codified a 
case-by-case standard.249 What remains is for trial courts to fall in line. 
The proposed amendment to Rule 23 would nudge courts towards 
this modernized understanding of class notice. It acknowledges E-
Notice methods, such as email.250 Yet, nothing in the proposed 
amendment would reorient reluctant courts’ perception of apt notice. 
 
(Michael Crew, Pier Luigi Parcu & Timothy Brennan eds., 2017) (discussing how email and mail 
are not yet commodities in the economic sense). Current data shows people are still more likely 
to open even junk mail than email. 10 Mind-Blowing Baby Boomer Facts, DMN3, 
https://www.dmn3.com/dmn3-blog/10-mind-blowing-direct-mail-statistics-and-what-they-mean 
[https://perma.cc/FVV3-RXBA]. However, this gap is beginning to close, particularly for 
millennials. Matt Mansfield, DIRECT MAIL MARKETING STATISTICS for Small Businesses, 
SMALL BUS. TRENDS (Jan. 10, 2017), https://smallbiztrends.com/2017/01/direct-mail-marketing-
statistics.html [https://perma.cc/6JDS-83ZV] (“When asked, ‘Which is more effective at getting 
you to take action?’ 30 percent of millennials said direct mail, 24 percent said email.”).  
 245. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); cf. Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 174–75 (1974) (citing Mullane for holding that “where the 
names and addresses of the beneficiaries were known,” a constitutionally valid means of notice 
requires at least notice by mail (citation omitted)).  
 246. Proposed Amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(3)(2) (adding language that notice may be 
given by “U.S. mail or electronic or other appropriate means”).  
 247. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
 248. Id. 
 249. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 250. Advisory Committee Memo, supra note 23. 
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The proposal does not go far enough to legitimize E-Notice options as 
equal or potentially superior methods of notice. 
Even without further changes to Rule 23, though, the judiciary can 
embrace modern notice methods through a closer reading of Supreme 
Court authority. Notice satisfies procedural due process when it is 
“reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections.”251 When individualized notice 
is possible, it is the starting point for evaluating reasonableness.252 
However, mail is but an exemplar—not a necessity. Individualized 
notice options should include email, texts, or private messages—not 
just mail.253 Similarly, constructive notice options should include 
websites, banner ads, or social media posts—not just hard copy 
publication.254 The use of mail and newspaper in Mullane does not bind 
future class notice plans.255 After all, such rigid categories conflict with 
the Supreme Court’s repeated statements about the flexibility of due 
process standards.256 
Moreover, a wider range of methods advances the foundational 
goal of Mullane—providing notice.257 E-Notice generates a more 
 
 251. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
 252. Id. at 318 (“Where the names and post-office addresses of those affected by a proceeding 
are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails to apprise them 
of its pendency.”). 
 253. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Anchor Drilling Fluids USA Inc., No. 4:15-CV-1344, 2015 WL 
12778393, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2015) (email); Boyd v. Coventry Health Care Inc., 299 F.R.D. 
451, 457 (D. Md. 2014) (email); In re Penthouse Exec. Club Comp. Litig., No. 10 CIV. 1145 KMW, 
2014 WL 185628, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2014) (text); In re AT & T Mobility Wireless Data Servs. 
Sales Tax Litig., 789 F. Supp. 2d 935, 968 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (text).  
 254. See, e.g., In re Auto. Parts Antitrust Litig., No. 12-MD-02311, 2016 WL 9280050, at *3 
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 28, 2016) (social media and Twitter); Spillman v. RPM Pizza, LLC, No. CIV.A. 
10-349-BAJ, 2013 WL 2286076, at *2 (M.D. La. May 23, 2013) (banner ads). 
 255. See, e.g., 18 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.01[5] (3d ed. 2005) (explaining that 
stare decisis is limited to pure questions of law); Lawrence C. Marshall, Contempt of Congress: A 
Reply to the Critics of an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2467, 2468–
69 (1990) (“There is a critical difference between the precedential import of a legal 
standard . . . and the specific application of the standard to the set of facts before the court. An 
absolute rule of statutory stare decisis does not claim to govern applications of law to changing 
factual patterns . . . .”). 
 256. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (“Due process, as this Court often has said, 
is a flexible concept that varies with the particular situation.”); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
334 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for 
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers 
Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (“[D]ue process . . . is not a technical conception with 
a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” (citation omitted)). 
 257. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“An elementary 
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robust understanding of the plan’s reach than traditional methods, by 
generating receipt and viewing information unavailable through 
traditional methods. The number of letters mailed is an unnecessarily 
imprecise measure. It does not reflect whether the letter was ever 
opened or simply tossed into the circular file.258 Over 50 percent of 
unsolicited mail ends up thrown out without ever being opened.259 
Similarly, newspaper circulation figures are only a circumstantial 
indicator of reach.260 
E-Notice, in contrast, can provide data on actual views—be it the 
number of opened emails, click-throughs, or conversion rates from 
online advertisements.261 Banner ads and website links help claims 
administrators track class responses262 and generate insights as to when 
modifying class notice would expand reach. Claims administrators—
and, ultimately, the courts—can actively manage such plans, monitor 
 
and fundamental requirement of due process . . . is notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections.”). 
 258. See, e.g., Fager v. CenturyLink Commc’ns, LLC, 854 F.3d 1167, 1173 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(noting an objector’s argument that class members were “likely to mistake the notice as junk mail 
and ignore it”).  
 259. Lina Younes, Put an End to Junk Mail, THE EPA BLOG, (Feb. 6, 2009), 
https://blog.epa.gov/blog/2009/02/put-an-end-to-junk-mail [https://perma.cc/H683-AKLZ]. 
Perhaps Andy Rooney best explains this approach to mail: “[I]f the envelope says IMPORTANT, 
you know it’s safe to throw away.” ANDY ROONEY, YEARS OF MINUTES: THE BEST OF ROONEY 
FROM 60 MINUTES (2007). 
 260. See PEW RES. INST., NEWSPAPERS TRY TO COUNT READERS DIFFERENTLY  
(Nov. 8, 2007), http://www.journalism.org/numbers/newspapers-try-to-count-readers-differently 
[https://perma.cc/L7NS-J2ZZ] (discussing the challenges of deriving actual readership from 
circulation figures).  
 261. See, e.g., In re Optical Disk Drive Prod. Antitrust Litig., No. 3:10-MD-2143 RS, 2016 WL 
7364803, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2016) (“[T]he indirect notice efforts generated over 207,530,045 
impressions, directing over 272,184 clicks through to the case website.”); Dewey v. Volkswagen 
of Am., 909 F. Supp. 2d 373, 380 (D.N.J. 2012) (using click-through rates to respond to an objector 
challenge to notice), aff’d sub nom. Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 558 F. App’x 191 
(3d Cir. 2014); In re Nat’l Arbitration Forum Trade Practices Litig., No. CV 10-2122 (PAM/JSM), 
2011 WL 13135575, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 8, 2011) (“Plaintiffs note that the banner ads regarding 
the settlement were viewed 190 million times, and that the website set up for the administration 
of the settlement received more than 100,000 ‘clicks.’”). 
 262. See, e.g., Edwards v. Nat’l Milk Producers Fed’n, No. 11-CV-04766-JSW, 2017 WL 
3623734, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2017) (breaking down E-Notice methods by numbers of 
impressions and corresponding figures of click-throughs to the settlement website).  
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class members’ behavior, and revise strategies as needed to enhance 
notice.263 Such maneuverability better “apprise[] interested parties.”264 
In addition to satisfying Mullane, E-Notice also advances the 
Supreme Court’s articulated goals for class actions. At its core, Rule 23 
is a procedural device intended to empower collective action through 
private enforcement.265 Class actions help balance individual and 
corporate power, ensuring potential recovery for harms that in the 
aggregate may be significant but individually are too small to justify 
suit.266 Antiquated definitions of procedural due process invite 
underdeterrence.267 In cases involving thousands of putative class 
 
 263. As one claims administrator explains: 
A real benefit of e-noticing is the flexibility one has in managing the class. In addition 
to providing a link to a dedicated settlement Web site where class members can receive 
additional information or even file claims, personal identifiers the Web site will 
recognize once the class member clicks through can be added in order to further 
streamline the claims process. Not only will an administrator know how many e-
mail notice recipients visited the Web site, but identifiers enable submitted claims to 
be matched with any personal information on record for the class members. This 
automation can save time and money in the review process. 
Cameron R. Azari, Clearing the Five Hurdles of Email Delivery of Class-Action Legal Notices, 15 
ANDREWS CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 2 (2008); see also, e.g., Pollard v. Remington Arms Co., 
LLC, 320 F.R.D. 198, 209 (W.D. Mo. 2017) (using E-Notice options to supplement notice and 
drive up response rates); Kaufman v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., No. 07-CV-1707, 
2016 WL 806546, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2016) (same) (subsequent history omitted).  
 264. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
 265. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS 
ACTION 232 (1987); see also Lopez v. Youngblood, No. CV-F-07-0474, 2011 WL 10483569, at *14 
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2011) (“[O]ne important purpose of the class action device is that defendants 
should not benefit from their wrongdoing, and should be deterred from doing so by being 
vulnerable to class actions to remedy their wrongful conduct.”); Abels v. JBC Legal Grp., P.C., 
227 F.R.D. 541, 546 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Christine P. Bartholomew, Saving Charitable Settlements, 
83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3241, 3265 (2015) (“Exposure to potential liability incentivizes actors to 
avoid wrongdoing and affects widespread change.”).  
 266. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating class 
action devices are “most compelling” with the “existence of a negative value suit”) (internal 
citation omitted); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968) (“[T]he class suit 
both eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation and provides small claimants with a method 
of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant individual 
litigation.”); Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1965) (describing a class 
action as “a device for vindicating claims which, taken individually, are too small to justify legal 
action but which are of significant size if taken as a group.”); see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do 
Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2083 (2010); Note, Locating 
Investment Asymmetries and Optimal Deterrence in the Mass Tort Class Action, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2665, 2671 (2004) (“[T]he need to aggregate small recoveries to make unmarketable claims 
into marketable class actions continues to sit close to the heart of Rule 23(b)(3).”). 
 267. Christine P. Bartholomew, Redefining Prey and Predator in Class Actions, 80 BROOK. L. 
REV. 743, 806 (2015) (discussing the relationship between barriers to certification and 
underdeterrence); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. L. REV. 729, 735 
(2013) (same); Byron G. Stier, Crimtorts, Class Actions, and the Emerging Mass Tort Method, 17 
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members, proof that mailed notice reached every class member would 
be impracticable at best and impossible at worst.268 Rather than 
undertake the costly risk of pursuing a non-certifiable case, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys may decline to file potential class claims.269 
A modernized interpretation ensures notice requirements do not 
impede certification.270 Allowing E-Notice as an adaptable alternative 
to traditional methods helps ensure corporate wrongdoing is redressed. 
In this way, E-Notice helps to protect the very cases for which class 
actions are intended271: those small-stakes claims where individuals 
have little incentive to retain records of purchase.272 Moreover, E-
Notice partly counteracts incentives for corporations to insulate 
themselves from liability by foregoing detailed customer records.273 
 
WIDENER L.J. 893, 897 (2008) (same). 
 268. See, e.g., Brown v. Rita’s Water Ice Franchise Co. LLC, 242 F. Supp. 356, 359 n.22 (E.D. 
Pa. 2017) (noting “[t]he fund administrator was unable to contact 3,835 class members” out of the 
138,000 class members).  
 269. See, e.g., Bartholomew, Saving Charitable Settlements, supra note 265, at 3267 n.184 (“[I]f 
class counsel cannot expect potential recovery for the vast time and monetary outlay associated 
with pursuing a class claim, attorneys simply will not take the case.”); see also Sofia Adrogué & 
Hon. Caroline Baker, Litigation in the 21st Century: The Jury Trial, the Training & the Experts, 56 
ADVOCATE (TEX.) 8, 12 (2011) (noting that “the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 . . . makes it 
too difficult and expensive for a consumer to bring a class action lawsuit,” which “inhibits 
attorneys’ ability to advocate for clients in need for legal assistance”); Christine P. Bartholomew, 
Death by Daubert: The Continued Attack on Private Antitrust, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2147, 2149–
50 (2014) (noting that “economist testimony plays a critical role in establishing the requirements 
for class certification” and that pre-class certification review of expert testimony could make 
plaintiffs “powerless to satisfy Rule 23”); Nantiya Ruan & Nancy Reichman, Hours Equity Is the 
New Pay Equity, 59 VILL. L. REV. 35, 75 (2014) (discussing how greater barriers for class actions 
means “fewer private plaintiffs’ attorneys are willing to risk the high costs of these cases”). 
 270. See, e.g., Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 947 (11th Cir. 2015) (denying 
class certification because of ascertainability); LaBauve v. Olin Corp., 231 F.R.D. 632, 662 (S.D. 
Ala. 2005) (same); accord Crosby v. Social Sec. Admin., 796 F.2d 576, 580 (1st Cir. 1986) (same); 
Noble v. 93 Univ. Place Corp., 224 F.R.D. 330, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (same).  
 271. See Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[Ascertainability] 
gives one factor in the balance absolute priority, with the effect of barring class actions where 
class treatment is often most needed: in cases involving relatively low-cost goods or services, 
where consumers are unlikely to have documentary proof of purchase.”).  
 272. For example, the Central District of California denied certification to a class of city 
parking lot users for violation of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act. The Court found 
the putative class was not sufficiently ascertainable because “[e]ven those few who retained their 
receipts dating back five years” would have to testify, as their receipts did not demonstrate 
consumer status. Rowden v. Pac. Parking Sys., Inc., 282 F.R.D. 581, 586 (C.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d in 
part sub nom. Martin v. Pac. Parking Sys. Inc., 583 F. App’x 803 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 273. See, e.g., Mullins, 795 F.3d at 668 (“[R]efusing to certify on th[e] basis [of ascertainability] 
effectively immunizes defendants from liability because they chose not to maintain records of the 
relevant transactions.”); Birchmeier v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 240, 250 (N.D. Ill. 
2014) (“Doing this—or declining to certify a class altogether, as defendants propose—would 
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Finally, to fulfill the spirit of Mullane, courts should focus squarely 
on the requirements of Rule 23—without adding new implied 
requirements. Ascertainability and tailored notice requirements 
depart from the purpose of Rule 23 and conflict with Mullane by 
encouraging courts to approve unnecessarily outdated notice plans. 
Given judicial acceptance of these additional hurdles to Rule 23 
certification and settlement approval, this risk is no longer a mere 
specter.274 These ungrounded requirements nudge courts further 
towards mandating actual notice275—despite the Supreme Court’s 
express rejection of such a requirement.276 However, this Article’s 
proposed change in course would allow lower courts to squarely focus 
on identifying “the best notice practicable”277 and avoid interpretative 
distractors. 
 
 
 
 
create an incentive for a person to violate the TCPA on a mass scale and keep no records of its 
activity, knowing that it could avoid legal responsibility for the full scope of its illegal conduct.”). 
 274. For an excellent summary of the growth of the ascertainability requirement, see Robert 
G. Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits: Parsing the Debates over Ascertainability and Cy Pres, 65 
U. KAN. L. REV. 913, 923–28 (2017). 
 275. See, e.g., Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 165 (3d Cir. 2015) (“We are ‘stringent in 
enforcing th[at] individual notice requirement.’ The separate ascertainability requirement 
ensures that class members can be identified after certification . . . .”) (citations omitted); Marcus 
v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012) (equating ascertainability with the “best 
notice practicable” requirement); see also Sarah R. Cansler, An “Insurmountable Hurdle” to Class 
Action Certification? The Heightened Ascertainability Requirement’s Effect on Small Consumer 
Claims, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1382, 1395 (2016) (“If heightened ascertainability requires actual notice, 
then Mullins (and other proposed classes where potential members may lack records to prove 
their membership) would fail the heightened ascertainability requirement, and the court would 
deny certification.”). 
 276. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950) (“[N]otice 
reasonably certain to reach most of those interested in objecting is likely to safeguard the interests 
of all, since any objections sustained would inure to the benefit of all. We think that under such 
circumstances reasonable risks that notice might not actually reach every beneficiary are 
justifiable.”); Fidel v. Farley, 534 F.3d 508, 514 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Due process does not, however, 
require actual notice to each party intended to be bound by the adjudication of a representative 
action.”); In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1110–11 (10th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the 
argument that Mullane requires actual notice); Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1453–54 (9th Cir. 
1994) (same); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig. MDL No. 381, 818 F.2d 145, 168–69 (2d Cir. 
1987) (same). 
 277. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317.  
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B. Using Analysis to Overcome Fear 
A second step towards E-Notice is more judicial oversight.278 
Building on a return to the principles of Mullane, courts must 
rigorously engage in evaluating and monitoring notice plans from the 
moment they are first submitted. Courts rarely engage in detailed 
analysis of the benefits and detriments of various modes of notice.279 
Rather, in well over 80 percent of cases, courts bless the parties’ 
proposals.280 In doing so, courts overlook the pressure parties face to 
rely on traditional notice.281 Innovation risks a court reconsidering 
certification or denying settlement approval.282 Innovation by parties 
also entails greater time expended by counsel and higher fees paid by 
clients, still with the possibility a plan may not be adopted.283 Further, 
from the perspective of the parties, innovation both encourages a 
greater number of objectors and potentially diminishes attorneys’ 
credibility with their clients in the event of an adverse decision.284 
Hence, it is incumbent on the judiciary to make the first move 
toward expanding notice options.285 Courts are already duty-bound to 
protect the interests of absent class members—including members’ 
 
 278. This need for more active case management is not limited to class notice. See REPORT 
TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL 
LITIGATION, SUBMITTED BY JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & 
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE 10 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/report_to_the_chief_justice.pdf. [https://perma.cc/L4BN-PWU3] (“Pleas for universalized 
and invigorated case management achieved strong consensus at the Conference. . . . Conference 
participants underscored that judicial case-management must be ongoing.”). 
 279. See, e.g., In re Optical Disk Drive Prod. Antitrust Litig., No. 3:10-MD-2143 RS, 2016 WL 
7364803, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2016) (engaging in detailed analysis of various methods of 
notice before approving notice plan).  
 280. See BARTHOLOMEW CLASS NOTICE STUDY, supra note 111 (tracking proposed versus 
approved notice plans). 
 281. See supra Part II.A (discussing why parties would be hesitant to propose novel methods). 
 282. Cf. The Influence of Mass Toxic Tort Litigation on Class Action Rules Reform, 22 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 249, 284–85 (2004) (discussing how innovation can risk certification denial). 
 283. See Giovanni B. Ramello, Aggregate Litigation and Regulatory Innovation: Another View 
of Judicial Efficiency, 32 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 63, 69 (2012) (comparing the lead actor in 
aggregate litigation, commonly the attorney or law firm, to “an entrepreneur who bears non-
insurable risks and introduces innovations in exchange for opportunities to profit”).  
 284. See BARTHOLOMEW, CLASS NOTICE STUDY, supra note 111; see also Figure J. 
 285. Two slight modifications to the proposed Rule 23 Subcommittee language could codify 
this approach. Currently, the proposal would amend only Rule 23(b)(3) to permit notice by “U.S. 
mail or electronic or other appropriate means.” Advisory Committee Memo, supra note 23. 
Instead, the amendment should be rewritten to apply to all Rule 23 notice. Second, “appropriate” 
should be replaced with “justified,” notice by “U.S. mail or electronic or other appropriate 
means.” Such modification is not essential, though it would be a step in the right direction.  
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constitutional right to notice.286 To fulfill this duty, judges need to 
weigh alternative notice methods before approving a notice plan.287 
This weighing of alternatives should start with the factors from 
Mullane: the cost of such notice, whether the individuals are unknown 
or missing, and the reach of the proposed form of notice.288 
Engagement with these factors will then incentivize parties to consider 
all possible notice options before presenting them to a watchful court. 
If, however, the Mullane factors are inconclusive, courts already 
have access to a proven framework for expanding notice analysis. The 
Third Circuit has proposed drawing an analogy between E-Discovery 
and notice to evaluate the reasonable degree of effort a defendant must 
undertake to identify class members from its records.289 The analogy 
need not be so narrow, though. Several factors used for evaluating E-
Discovery plans apply equally to notice, such as whether “the burden 
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,” as 
well as “the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the 
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of 
the discovery in resolving the issues.”290 
Judicial review of notice should then endure beyond initial 
approval of a proposed plan. Courts should continue monitoring the 
plan’s efficacy throughout execution. At each inquiry, judges would 
ideally consider the full tool belt of possible notice methods, as more 
options would allow for more finely calibrated plans. 
Assuming judges actively analyze and supervise class notice plans, 
E-Notice would likely continue to expand. E-Notice generates more 
 
 286. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1124 (7th 
Cir. 1979) (discussing the court’s “‘fiduciary’ duty to the non-representative class members”); In 
re Glob. Crossing Sec. & ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (same); Christopher 
R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 
FLA. L. REV. 71, 130 (2007) (“The court’s fundamental duty is to protect the interests of class 
members, even if they do not object.”). 
 287. See Todd B. Hilsee, Shannon R. Wheatman, Ph.D. & Gina M. Intrepido, Do You Really 
Want Me to Know My Rights? The Ethics Behind Due Process in Class Action Notice Is More 
Than Just Plain Language: A Desire to Actually Inform, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1359, 1372 
(2005) (“[C]ourts should regularly be presented with data and calculations—at the outset, 
conservatively performed by qualified experts and professionals—which would verify the 
adequacy of a proposed outreach program for a notice campaign. In doing so, notice programs 
would improve dramatically.”). 
 288. Id. at 316–17. 
 289. See Larson v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 687 F.3d 109, 131 (3d Cir. 2012) (recognizing that 
“e-discovery practice [does not] provide[] a perfect parallel. . . . Nevertheless, these e-discovery 
principles may provide a helpful template.”). 
 290. FED R. CIV. P. 26 (listing factors). 
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usable information on a plan’s reach than outdated methods.291 This 
data can inform courts how best to supplement a notice plan, if 
needed.292 
Engagement has a secondary benefit. It responds to a common 
attack levied against class actions—namely, that they unduly 
compromise absent class members’ autonomy in the litigation 
process.293 The response rates in opt-in class actions—cases where class 
members must submit a claim to recover monetary damages—are often 
less than 10 percent,294 particularly for small-stake claims. 
Critics use these low rates as tenuous evidence that individuals 
would prefer not having such cases brought on their behalf,295 though 
such a conclusion is questionable.296 Even assuming its legitimacy, a 
 
 291. See supra Part II.C (describing the gains of E-Notice plans).  
 292. Alterations in the class definition warrant repeated notice. See, e.g., In re New Motor 
Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., No. 2:03-MD-1532-DBH, 2012 WL 313948, at *1 (D. Me. 
Jan. 31, 2012) (requiring supplemental notice after the court altered settlement at the final 
approval hearing); Holman v. Student Loan Xpress, Inc., No. 8:08-CV-305-T-23MAP, 2010 WL 
4054275, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2010) (providing supplemental notice for changes to subclasses); 
Williams v. San Bernardino Cty., No. EDCV 09-00092-VAP(VBK), 2009 WL 1844296, at *3 (C.D. 
Cal. June 18, 2009) (approving supplemental notice to newly identified class members). Other 
times, courts order supplemental notice to drive up response rates. See, e.g., Weber v. Gov’t Emps. 
Ins. Co., 262 F.R.D. 431, 440 (D.N.J. 2009) (using repeated notice to increase class response rate 
by just over 5 percent).  
 293. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1654 (2008) (“Class actions further compromise litigant autonomy, for 
absent class members typically express their consent to a binding settlement not affirmatively but 
only tacitly, through their failure to withdraw from the class representation.”). 
 294. See, e.g., Gascho v. Glob. Fitness Holdings, LLC, No. 2:11-cv-436, 2014 WL 1350509, at 
*30 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 4, 2014) (accepting expert testimony “that response rates in class actions 
generally range from one to 12 percent with a median response rate, and a normal consumer 
response rate, of approximately five to eight percent”) (citation omitted).  
 295. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and 
the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1601 (2007) (discussing “the 
traditional litigant autonomy concern that is threatened by any forced inclusion in a class 
proceeding”); Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs, and the Right Not to Sue, 
115 COLUM. L. REV. 599, 646 (2015) (“An individual . . . may well perceive the forced inclusion 
of her claim in a mandatory class action as posing a far greater threat to her autonomy.”); cf. 
Charles Silver, A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 
656, 663 (1991) (“The practice of granting fee awards forces class members to pay for services and 
benefits they neither request nor, in many cases, are free to reject. In other words, it requires them 
to participate in exchanges without their consent.”). 
 296. Class members may not participate for far less nefarious reasons. Apathy is a more likely 
culprit. Similarly, requiring proof of purchase or other documentation with a claim may 
disincentive participation just enough. For example, consider the claims process in Pearson v. 
NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 2014). The case involved allegations of false claims by a dietary 
supplement manufacturer. Id. at 779. Class members were purchasers of the supplement. Id. The 
proposed settlement resulted in a low response rate, as well as reversal by the Seventh Circuit. Id. 
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central precept of autonomy-based arguments is individuals can better 
evaluate their own interests than even the most benevolent state.297 To 
properly conduct such an evaluation, though, information is essential. 
E-Notice has the potential to inform more class members simply 
because the platforms it utilizes are widely used. Take Facebook: users 
spend roughly fifty minutes a day on the social media platform—a 
figure far in excess of the amount of time spent reading mail in a day, 
let alone a week.298 With traditional notice, only those who receive 
mailed notices or stumble upon printed ads learn about the litigation. 
E-Notice’s potentially greater reach means more consumer education 
about class actions. 
Better-informed class members translates to more autonomy in 
deciding whether to be bound by the outcome of class litigation.299 Such 
notice directs individuals to settlement websites they may not 
otherwise come upon. These websites often educate class members 
about the claims process in a particular case, while also serving as 
 
at 782–83, 787. In its decision, the appellate court itemized several barriers created by the notice 
plan: 
One would have thought, given the low ceiling on the amount of money that a member 
of the class could claim, that a sworn statement would be sufficient documentation, 
without requiring receipts or other business records likely to have been discarded. The 
requirement of needlessly elaborate documentation, the threats of criminal 
prosecution, and the fact that a claimant might feel obliged to wade through the five 
other documents accessible from the opening screen of the website, help to explain why 
so few recipients of the postcard notice bothered to submit a claim. 
Id. at 783. Nor do these low response rates necessarily demonstrate a preference for regulatory 
enforcement solely by administrative agencies or attorneys general rather than private 
enforcement. Patrick A. Luff, Bad Bargains: The Mistake of Allowing Cost-Benefit Analyses in 
Class Action Certification Decisions, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 65, 68 (2010) (discussing criticisms of 
class actions).  
 297. See JOHN S. MILL, ESSAY ON LIBERTY 93 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978). 
 298. See James B. Stewart, Facebook Has 50 Minutes of Your Time Each Day. It Wants More., 
N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/business/facebook-bends-the-
rules-of-audience-engagement-to-its-advantage.html [https://perma.cc/Y6GB-STJM]; see also 
supra note 234 and accompanying text.  
 299. Cf. Joshua P. Davis, Eric L. Cramer & Caitlin V. May, The Puzzle of Class Actions with 
Uninjured Members, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 858, 869 (2014) (“The failure to require actual notice 
has implications for both autonomy and compensation. A class member cannot exercise choice in 
class litigation—she cannot decide whether to opt out of litigation or object to any proposed 
settlement—if she does not know it is occurring.”); Jeffrey P. Donohue, Developing Issues Under 
the Massachusetts ‘Physician Profile’ Act, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 115, 130–31 (1997) (“[A]ny increase 
in consumer information—in any market—would thus improve self-determination and heighten 
this form of autonomy.”). This is not to suggest, as some have, that opt-in class actions are 
superior. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 135–37 (2009). To the contrary, such an 
approach just creates different autonomy concerns. This opt-in approach, however, could actually 
restrict class member autonomy. See Davis et al., supra, at 872. 
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“educational portals that provide information on everything from the 
basic rules to the most complex issues in class action litigation.”300 
Admittedly, this call for more judicial engagement is not new. As 
one scholar recently explained, “Courts must . . . be more active in 
policing whether the notice was or will be the best practicable . . . .”301 
However, such calls have yet to be coupled with empirical evidence 
backing claims of judicial inconsistency and reticence towards modern 
technology. This grounded understanding hopefully will spur action. 
C. Drawing Notice Plans out from the Shadows 
After such engagement, a third and final adjustment would 
promote E-Notice. Appellate courts must engage with class notice 
plans to ensure effective notice, to sharpen the reasoning of the district 
courts they oversee, and to enforce the constitutional parameters of 
due process. Accordingly, trial courts should endeavor to memorialize 
the judicial reasoning for approving a particular plan.302 A trial court 
should no longer passively acquiesce to a joint plan triggering huge 
postal costs without fleshed-out, written justification. This is 
particularly true given notice is not just a pro forma obligation in class 
action settlements. Rather, such notice fulfills a constitutional mandate 
for due process.303 While such a final step creates an administrative 
burden, some courts already provide detailed notice decisions, 
illustrating the feasibility of such a proposal.304 
Once judges explain their reasoning, detailed notice decisions 
would also help trigger the appellate engagement necessary to 
modernize notice plans. Detailed reasoning shines a light on 
 
 300. Robert H. Klonoff, Mark Herrmann & Bradley W. Harrison, Making Class Actions 
Work: The Untapped Potential of the Internet, 13 J. INTERNET L. 1, 14 (2009).  
 301. Scheibel, supra note 10, at 1361 (proposing more active engagement “whether by 
independently considering and researching notice options or by requiring detailed justifications 
from the parties for why the notice meets Rule 23(c)(2)(B)’s standard and should be considered 
sufficient in light of absent parties’ due process rights”). 
 302. This proposal is in accord with another pending amendment to Rule 23, which urges 
more detailed Rule 23 opinions. Advisory Committee Memo, supra note 23. 
 303. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. (guaranteeing “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 304. See, e.g., Larson v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 07-5325JLL, 2009 WL 1228443, at *4–10 
(D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2009) (comparing the attempted notice program to the notice required by Rule 
23); In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 228 F.R.D. 75, 84–86 (D. Mass. 2005) (same); cf. 
Korrow v. Aaron’s Inc., No. CV 10-6317, 2015 WL 7720491, at *10 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2015) 
(comparing the cost of an additional notice method to the potential gains).  
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interpretations that deviate from Rule 23. This affords appellate courts 
the opportunity to apply true de novo review of the standards lower 
courts use in approving notice and reverse plans that stray from 
Mullane.305 Stated more directly, detailed notice plans should help 
appellate courts curtail the growth of implied Rule 23 requirements, 
such as ascertainability or tailored notice.306 Not only will this help 
cultivate E-Notice, it will help preserve the notion of constructive 
notice.307 
The judicial weighing of notice alternatives proposed in Part III.B. 
requires factual findings. Appellate courts should review such findings 
under a “clearly erroneous” standard of review.308 Such an approach 
would bring balance to the notice approval process. It ensures 
compliance with constitutional rights and increased transparency309 
while simultaneously providing a quasi-safe harbor for fully reasoned 
notice plan orders. A clearly erroneous standard would protect 
thorough trial courts from unwelcome reversals.310 It would also place 
a higher burden on objectors, thus insulating plans from frivolous 
 
 305. Appellate oversight should also aim to protect against frivolous objections. As discussed 
in Part I, objectors are double-edged swords. See supra Part I.B and accompanying footnotes. 
Though well-situated to raise concerns about the mode of notice, objectors can wield their power 
to coerce modifications that do little to actually benefit class members. To minimize this risk, 
objectors should have to provide actual proof to back up challenges to notice. Conjecture and 
speculation alone have dominated notice decisions long enough. For example, if an objector 
claims an alternative method of notice will reach a greater number of class members at a lower 
cost, such a claim requires evidentiary support—be it an affidavit from a claims administrator or 
comparative cost figures from prior litigation.  
 306. See supra Part I.B (describing these implied requirements). 
 307. See supra Parts I.B and II.C (discussing how tailoring and ascertainability undermine 
constructive notice).  
 308. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (explaining that under the “clear 
error” standard of review, “a reviewing court must ask whether, ‘on the entire evidence,’ it is ‘left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed’” (quoting United States 
v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). 
 309. These transparency gains would increase if trial courts consistently issued opinions on 
class notice. Specifically for (b)(3) class certification notice, courts currently trend toward issuing 
unreported orders rather than released opinions. See, e.g., Nitsch v. DreamWorks Animation 
SKG Inc., 315 F.R.D. 270, 317 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (approving class certification but deferring the 
notice determination); Wahl v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 243 F.R.D. 291, 301 (N.D. Ill. 2007) 
(same). As a result, such orders are not available on Westlaw or Lexis. Ellen Platt, Unpublished 
vs. Unreported, 5 NO. 1 PERSP: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 26 (1996).  
 310. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of 
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 77–78 (1994) (detailing evidence that trial 
courts dislike reversal on appeal); Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and the 
Judicial Hierarchy, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 557 (2011) (“[J]udges undoubtedly dislike being 
reversed . . . .”). 
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objections. Concurrently, this standard would preserve appellate 
courts’ ability to weed out decisions that prioritize unsubstantiated 
fears over class members’ best interests.311 Hence, more detailed 
findings in class notice decisions would potentially benefit class 
members in a given case, as well as improve future class notice plans. 
Social scientists and advertisers are continuing to study online 
marketing and are learning that not all ads are equal.312 Click-through 
rates depend on the product and ad at issue.313 The effectiveness of 
online ads varies depending on the forum. When consumers are highly 
“engaged” with a media vehicle they are more responsive to such 
ads.314 Currently, the judiciary’s shared experience with E-Notice is too 
limited to know if these trends carry over to class notice.315 
A 2016 Northern District of California antitrust case illustrates 
how E-Notice can achieve these gains.316 In re Optical Disk Drive317 
involved a class of indirect purchasers of Panasonic optical disk drives. 
 
 311. Long term, E-Notice may even help measure the legitimacy of these autonomy critiques. 
To date, the cases involving E-Notice do not have notably higher opt-out rates. However, the 
total number of decisions that include sufficient information to asses this are statistically de 
minimis. If increased notice results in increased opt-outs, this would support class action critics. 
If, however, increased notice has no impact on opt-out rates, it will at least partially refute 
autonomy-based challenges. Measuring such correlations may not reveal why class members fail 
to respond, but it would narrow the range of possible reasons.  
 312. See, e.g., JAMES MATHEWSON & MIKE MORAN, OUTSIDE-IN MARKETING: USING BIG 
DATA TO GUIDE YOUR CONTENT MARKETING 22 (2016) (noting “not all paid search advertising 
works”); JOSEPH PLUMMER, STEPHEN D. RAPPAPORT, TADDY HALL & ROBERT BAROCCI, THE 
ONLINE ADVERTISING PLAYBOOK 42 (2007) (“[N]ot all sites, even those with similar content, 
build audience at the same rate.”). 
 313. See Mark Irvine, Google AdWords Benchmarks for YOUR Industry, 
WORDSTREAM (June 26, 2018), https://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2016/02/29/
google-adwords-industry-benchmarks [https://perma.cc/V85T-CYCX] (providing click-
through rates by industry for Google AdWords campaigns); Digital Display Ad Benchmarks in 
H1 2016, by Vertical and Region, MARKETINGCHARTS (Nov. 28, 2016), 
http://www.marketingcharts.com/industries/pharma-and-healthcare-72605 [https://perma.cc/ 
ZEY9-MZ9E]. 
 314. See, e.g., Bobby J. Calder, Edward C. Malthouse & Ute Schaedel, An Experimental Study 
of the Relationship between Online Engagement and Advertising Effectiveness, 23 J. INTERACTIVE 
MKTG. 321 (2009); Todd Cunningham, Amy Shea Hall & Charles Young, The Advertising 
Magnifier Effect: An MTV Study, 4 J. ADVERT. RES. 46 (2006).  
 315. Similarly, the information in such opinions could tease out potential barriers to filing a 
claim. For example, with E-Notice, a court might use the number of views and clicks to discern 
whether notice is actually reaches the class. If, however, there were a high number of clicks but 
few claims filed, that would prompt a review of the class notice’s content or the claims 
administration process for answers.  
 316. In re Optical Disk Drive Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 3:10-MD-2143 RS, 2016 WL 
7364803, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2016). 
 317. Id. at *1. 
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As part of a settlement, the Court approved notice through 
publication, internet advertising, banner ads, and press releases.318 
Even without individual mailing, this multiplatform notice plan 
reached at least 70 percent of the class.319 As the Court explained, the 
reach was greater than originally estimated: “In total, the indirect 
notice efforts generated over 207,530,045 impressions, directing over 
272,184 clicks through to the case website. The volume of impressions 
generated was nearly 11 million more than estimated in the Notice 
plan.”320 
Wide and effective reach was only one benefit of this multifaceted 
notice plan, though. The plan also provided information on which 
modes of notice most successfully directed class members to the 
settlement website.321 For example, banner and text link advertising on 
Facebook generated more click-throughs than Twitter or Google 
ads.322 Even more successful, though, were hypertargeted banner ads.323 
This data will guide future courts seeking to replicate the success of this 
plan in later cases with similar class demographics. However, such 
gains are only possible because Judge Richard Seeborg provided a 
detailed class notice opinion. 
Thus, the best course for modernizing class notice must include 
deeper engagement in the development and continued monitoring of 
notice plans by both trial and appellate courts. The Supreme Court has 
already mapped out a clear course in Mullane—a course Congress has 
codified.324 Following this path through judicial engagement and 
shared information will likely banish any lingering trepidation about 
 
 318. Id. at *3. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. (setting forth methods of notice, number of impressions, and number of click-
throughs).  
 322. Id. (comparing “4,481,222 impressions with 89,327 clicks through to the case website” on 
Facebook with “1,770,199 impressions with 16,209 clicks through” from Twitter and “4,593,972 
impressions with 8,092 clicks through” from Google). 
 323. Id. (describing “creative banner advertisements that utilizes behavioral audience 
targeting, contextual targeting, mobile inventory, and prospecting to reach likely class members—
which resulted in 196,122,505 impressions with 158,556 clicks through to the case website”). 
 324. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 
amendments (referencing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)); 
Harvey Rochman, Due Process: Accuracy or Opportunity?, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2705, 2723 (1992) 
(discussing how subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence and “the Advisory Committee’s notes 
to rule 23(c)(2) all refer to Mullane v. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. for an explanation of the due 
process requirement of notice”). 
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E-Notice. What is needed is judicial oversight, with a clear adherence 
to controlling precedent—not controlling norms. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts are dipping their toes into the deep end of E-Notice. When 
traditional mailed notice is not possible, some courts demonstrate a 
degree of creativity and daring. Unfortunately, this is a rarity. Fear of 
change, fear of technology, and fear of imperfection keep many courts 
firmly rooted on the safe shores of antiquity, ordering mail and 
publication notice and sacrificing potentially farther-reaching notice 
methods. 
Courts already have the power to consider the pros and cons of 
various methods of notice under Rule 23. Triggering this analysis is 
dependent first on establishing oversight matters, not only to further 
the goals of class actions but also to avoid distortion of procedural due 
process jurisprudence. 
This Article does the heavy lifting necessary to prove courts are 
falling behind society’s use of technology. It exposes the fears 
underlying long-standing scholarly and judicial assumptions that run 
contrary to E-Notice. It also reveals existing interpretative barriers that 
distort the class notice analysis, then offers feasible solutions. 
Notably, this Article does not advocate for any single form of E-
Notice. Instead, the hope is to spur judicial engagement and abate 
decisionmaking based on fear. The case review and empirical analysis 
underpinning this Article serve as a springboard for a more informed 
procedural due process evaluation of class notice plans. Perhaps with 
this new understanding, the tired fiction of searching through 
newspapers for class notices can finally come to rest. 
 
